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United Nations

Report of the Special Committee against Apartheid

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Official Records • Forty-seventh Session
Supplement No. 22 (A/47/22)

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

4 November 1992

Excellency,

I have the honour to send you herewith the report of the Special Committee against Apartheid, which was adopted by the Special Committee on 4 November 1992. The report is submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council in accordance with the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolutions 2671 (XXV) of 8 December 1970 and 46/79 A to F of 13 December 1991.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Ibrahim A. GAMBARI
Chairman of the
Special Committee against Apartheid

His Excellency
Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York, NY 10017

Part One

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In the present report, the Special Committee against Apartheid, under its mandate and in response to General Assembly resolutions 46/79 C and D of 13 December 1991, reviews political, economic, military and other developments relating to the process towards the peaceful elimination of apartheid in South Africa and aimed at the establishment of a non-racial and democratic society based on a new constitution, negotiated and agreed on within a broad-based and democratically representative forum. It will be recalled that these are goals enunciated in the Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa, adopted by consensus by the General Assembly on 14 December 1989 (resolution S-16/1, annex) and further supported in Assembly resolution 46/79 A of 13 December 1991, equally adopted by consensus. The report, which covers the period from September 1991 to September 1992, also reviews the activities of the Special Committee against Apartheid with regard to these developments.

2. A wide range of sources has been used for the elaboration of the report: documents and statements, statistics and research publications, periodicals and newspapers. Conferences, seminars, hearings and round tables organized or co-sponsored by the Special Committee provided a unique opportunity to discuss and assess different aspects of the situation in South Africa with South Africans, representatives of non-governmental organizations, of United Nations offices and agencies, and of other intergovernmental organizations, and with experts from the international academic community. Background papers and other materials from these forums were also used during the preparation of the report.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

A. Negotiation process

3. Since the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly, important developments have continued to occur in South Africa as part of that country's move towards a democratic and non-racial society. The process of creating a negotiating framework towards the peaceful end of apartheid culminated in the launching in December 1991 of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). Since then, however, negotiations have been hampered by repeated setbacks and delays, owing in great part to the persistent political violence.

1. CODESA I

4. The first plenary session of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa, or CODESA I, was held at Johannesburg on 20 and 21 December 1991. Nineteen parties and organizations participated in the deliberations, which were also attended by numerous observers, including the observer delegation of the United Nations led by the Chairman of the Special Committee. The 19 participants included the Government of South Africa, the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the governments of the so-called "independent homelands" and a number of political parties such as the Democratic Party and the Solidarity Party, but not the Conservative Party and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO).

5. The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) declined to take part in the meeting of CODESA, stating that the Convention was undemocratic and insisting on negotiations to be held at a neutral venue under a neutral convener. It also reasserted its demand for an elected constituent assembly.

6. The participants adopted a Declaration of Intent whereby they committed themselves to "bring about an undivided South Africa free from apartheid" and to some fundamental constitutional principles. The adoption of the Declaration, together with the undertaking by all participants to hold themselves bound by CODESA's decisions, their expressed will to expand participation in CODESA and the setting up of working groups to deal with major points of contention, were an indication of the consensus achieved at CODESA I and of its success. The five working groups were entrusted, respectively, with the following tasks: creation of a climate for free political participation; general constitutional principles; transitional arrangements/interim government; reincorporation of the homelands; and time-frames and implementation of CODESA's decisions.

2. Referendum

7. In February 1992, following a victory by the Conservative Party (CP) in a parliamentary by-election, President F. W. de Klerk called on the White electorate to vote through a referendum on the constitutional reforms introduced over the past two years. On 17 March 1992, 68.7 per cent of the more than 2.8 million White voters casting ballots in a national referendum voted "yes" in response to the question "Do you support the continuation of the reform process which the State President began on 2 February 1990 and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiations?"

8. This result had a major impact on the pursuit of the negotiations and on the attitude of the world community towards South Africa. It was widely acclaimed within and outside South Africa as a major step forward, since it demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of White South Africans supported the process of negotiations. Observers, however, cautioned against premature euphoria, noting that the constitutional proposals of the major parties to CODESA still differed substantially on fundamental issues and that the National Party (NP) could interpret the positive outcome of the referendum as a mandate to harden its position in the negotiations. The anti-apartheid forces denounced and strongly criticized the holding of a "White-only referendum", an exercise they said amounted to giving Whites a veto power. Furthermore, the South African regime budgeted R5 billion for secret operations. This amount was not subject to audit. 2/

3. CODESA II

9. The second plenary session of CODESA was held on 15 and 16 May 1992. The same 19 parties and organizations that were represented at CODESA I in December 1991 also attended CODESA II. The observer delegation of the United Nations was led by the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, a member of the Special Committee.

10. The five working groups established by CODESA I submitted their reports to the plenary session. These reports indicated that significant progress had been made in spite of the obstacles that had hampered discussions over a number of vital issues. They also indicated that consensus had been reached on the following issues:

(a) The transition to democracy would involve two preliminary phases. During a first phase, a multi-party Transitional Executive Council would level the political playing field and prepare the country for elections. In a second phase, an assembly elected by proportional representation and universal suffrage would elaborate and adopt a new constitution. This parliament would also hold normal legislative powers in the interim;

(b) All parties agreed "in principle" to the reincorporation of "independent homelands" and the restoration of South African citizenship to their residents. Their votes would be counted separately in national elections, so as to test their support for reincorporation;

(c) All security forces should be placed under the control of the transitional governmental structures and held accountable to the public. All parties needed to recommit themselves to the letter and spirit of the National Peace Accord, and the international community should be called upon to provide assistance to facilitate the implementation of the Accord.

11. One of the working groups, however, was unable to reach an agreement on a number of issues related to the constitution-making process and participants in CODESA II failed in their turn to solve these issues, which can be summed up as follows:

(a) The percentage of votes needed in the interim parliament to approve constitutional provisions dealing with division of powers and more

specifically with regionalism; ANC first proposed that only a two-thirds majority be required. It then offered to increase that figure to 70 per cent, but the Government insisted on a 75 per cent margin. This apparently small difference could have important implications in terms of the present Government's ability to retain a power of veto on these issues;

(b) The establishment of an Upper House (or Senate) where minorities would be disproportionately represented. This second issue is, in fact, closely linked to the first one and to the power given or not to minorities to block important decisions on constitutional reform.

12. This deadlock prevented consideration of the reports of the other working groups, since ANC would not accept a partial agreement, as suggested by the Government, but insisted on the adoption of a complete package of proposals together with precise time-frames for their implementation. Participants mandated CODESA's Management Committee with resolving these outstanding issues and drafting legislation formalizing agreements reached so far. The Committee was unable, however, to achieve any tangible progress during the following weeks.

4. Other political views and activities

13. The establishment of a Patriotic United Front, at a conference held at Durban in October 1991, set up an important framework for bringing together ANC and PAC - the main forces involved in the Durban Conference - as well as other anti-apartheid political organizations, many of which have different perceptions of the negotiations.

14. Nevertheless, discussions held during the last few months between PAC and the Government of South Africa could be an indication that PAC will eventually take part in the process of negotiations. A first meeting was held in April at Abuja between a delegation of PAC, headed by its Deputy President, Mr. Dikgang Moseneke, and representatives of the Government of South Africa, led by Mr. Roelof F. Botha, Minister for Foreign Affairs. The parties agreed to hold further talks. 3/

15. In another development, AZAPO also indicated its preparedness to join negotiations providing the Government of South Africa met certain of its demands. 4/

16. At the other end of the political spectrum, members of a reformist group within the Conservative Party (CP), known in political circles as the "new right", announced their decision to renounce the old policies of apartheid and to join open-ended negotiations in which special protection for Afrikaners' rights would be sought within a federal structure. 5/

B. Outstanding issues and their impact on political settlement

1. Violence

17. In spite of the National Peace Accord signed on 14 September 1991 between 23 parties, including the Government of South Africa, ANC and IFP, political violence continues to wreak havoc in the black townships. According to the Human Rights Commission (HRC), a South African non-governmental organization, some 300 people now die each month in political violence. 6/ There is mounting evidence that some members of the security forces are implicated in this violence. The violence continues to hamper free political expression greatly and still constitutes the most serious threat to the process of a peacefully negotiated transition to a non-racial democratic society in South Africa. In this context, investigators from the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists concluded at the end of a mission to the province of Natal and the Johannesburg area that "it would not be possible to hold free and fair elections on a one person, one vote basis today in the parts of South Africa" that they had visited. 7/

18. The violence reached unprecedented and dramatic levels during the period under review. In August 1992, 348 persons died in political violence in South Africa, bringing the total of victims killed since the signing of the National Peace Accord to more than 3,400. 8/ For many observers, ordinary residents in the townships as well as members of organizations in the democratic movement and individuals suffer more now than they ever did under states of emergency in the mid-1980s.

19. There has also been a shift in the nature of the violence, less of it being directly attributed to security forces (at least until the Ciskei massacre) and more apparently aimed at terrorizing residents through indiscriminate attacks such as the ones on train commuters. While fewer political arrests have taken place, political activists continue to be the targets of assassinations by hit squads (86 were murdered so far in 1992). 9/ Security forces themselves have also been frequently attacked. According to some sources, 168 policemen were killed during the first eight months of 1992). 9/ Statistics published by HRC indicate that, whereas the majority of victims of violence have been ordinary residents of Black townships, a degree of political affiliation, however, could be identified for up to half of the fatal victims. Of those, some 16 per cent were assumed to be affiliated with IFP, while the rest, about 84 per cent, appeared linked to ANC. 10/

20. Suspicions that the South African Police (SAP) was not acting efficiently or impartially to quell the violence, and that it was frequently involved in these very acts, have been strengthened in the period under consideration by numerous allegations published in the press as well as by a judgement passed in April 1992 by the Supreme Court of Natal. In this last case, five policemen were found guilty of carrying out a massacre in which 11 Black villagers were killed in 1988, and it was stated that the police had been "incompetent or not interested" in investigating the killings. The White police captain who led the massacre was sentenced to death. 11/ Furthermore, newspapers published reports alleging that the present head of military intelligence was personally implicated in the murder of anti-apartheid activist Matthew Goniwe and three colleagues in 1985, and that he had requested permission from the State Security Council to carry out this

operation. There were also reports of further collusion between the police and perpetrators of violence, according to which SAP had established a network of secret bases in the Southern Transvaal, from which it orchestrated an assassination campaign against anti-apartheid activists. 12/

21. Incidents in which members of the South African Defence Force (SADF) attacked residents of squatter camps have also deepened the distrust of these forces among Black South Africans. Moreover, the allocation, in the last State budget, of half of the defence funds to the secret Special Defence Account is seen as evidence of a lack of transparency in the activities of SADF.

22. Additional attention was focused on the issue of violence with the release of various reports, in particular the report of Amnesty International 13/ and that, mentioned above, of the International Commission of Jurists. 7/ Both were very critical of the inability of the Government of South Africa to stop the violence and stressed the role played by the security forces, as well as IFP, in this violence.

23. The Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, chaired by Justice Richard Goldstone and established in terms of the National Peace Accord, issued its second interim report in April 1992. While the Commission stated that it had not received evidence of a "third force" orchestrating the violence, and that "both the ANC and IFP have been guilty of many incidents that have resulted in the deaths of and injuries to large numbers of people", it criticized the Government's failure to take sufficiently firm steps to prevent criminal conduct by members of the security forces and to punish the perpetrators.

24. A report by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights to the General Assembly on the question of the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination (A/47/412, annex) stated that in South Africa mercenary groups had been responsible for acts of repression against leaders of liberation movements and for massacres carried out in suburbs inhabited by the Black majority. Recent anti-apartheid reforms had resulted in the establishment of commissions investigating crimes committed by members and specialized agencies of SADF and the police. Investigating commissions had established that mercenaries did participate in the implementation of apartheid policies and that they were entrusted with the most violent actions.

25. In the context of violence, PAC has expressed the view that the major source of violence in South Africa is the South African regime, and that violence would continue until all mercenaries, such as the Buffalo Battalion and the Koevoet, were expelled from the country under international supervision and all death squads were disbanded.

26. While President de Klerk's announcement, on 14 July, that the particularly discredited Battalions 31 and 32 and the Koevoet unit of the security forces would be disbanded was welcomed by some anti-apartheid organizations, they have called for wider measures to be taken and, in particular, for the prompt implementation of the recommendations made by Justice Goldstone, such as the total ban on the carrying of dangerous weapons.

2. The Boipatong massacre

27. On the night of 17 June 1992, armed men attacked residents in the township of Boipatong, near Johannesburg, killing at least 40 men, women and children. Numerous witnesses alleged that the attackers, who apparently came from a nearby hostel, were supporters of IFP and were assisted by members of the police. The Government and the police immediately denied being implicated in the incident. Relations between the Government and ANC were further strained after a visit to Boipatong by President de Klerk on 20 June 1992, when angry demonstrators forced the President to leave the area. Following his departure, unprovoked firing is reported to have led to several casualties, including three members of PAC.

28. On 23 June 1992, the ANC National Executive Committee held an emergency meeting, at the end of which it decided to suspend bilateral talks with the Government as well as its participation in CODESA negotiations, while reaffirming its commitment to a negotiated resolution of the conflict. Accusing the Government of fomenting violence, ANC demanded that it:

(a) Agree to create an elected constitutional assembly;

(b) Set up an interim government;

(c) End all covert operations;

(d) Disband all special forces and detachments made up of foreign nationals;

(e) Suspend and prosecute all members of the security forces involved in the violence;

(f) Ensure an end to repression in the homelands;

(g) Start the phasing out of hostels;

(h) Install fences around the hostels;

(i) Guard the hostels permanently;

(j) Search the hostels on a regular basis;

(k) Ban all dangerous weapons;

(l) Set up an international commission of inquiry into the Boipatong massacre and other acts of violence;

(m) Repeal all repressive legislation;

(n) Release all political prisoners.

29. ANC rejected an offer by the Government to hold talks first, but handed to President de Klerk a memorandum outlining these 14 demands. 14/

30. On 2 July 1992, President de Klerk issued his response in a long memorandum to Mr. Nelson Mandela, President of ANC. His memorandum denied the allegation that the Government was sponsoring the violence and reiterated the warning that mass mobilization would inevitably lead to further violence.

31. At the end of June 1992, Justice Goldstone, Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, asked Dr. Peter Waddington, Director of Criminal Justice Studies at the University of Reading in England, and two other British experts to evaluate the investigation carried out by the South African Police (SAP) into the Boipatong massacre. Dr. Waddington presented their report on 24 July 1992. While the report stated that there was no evidence of police collusion in the killings, it described SAP as suffering from "serious organizational problems". Inadequate command and control, in particular, had "allowed the massacre to be perpetrated unhindered", and it appeared that the police lacked effective intelligence and contingency planning. The investigation had been conducted in an unstructured and inadequate manner, which undermined evidence gathering. Hostility and non-cooperation from the township residents had also impeded the investigation. This, however, could partly be attributed to the insufficient awareness by the police of the importance of working on community relations and to their perceived bias in favour of hostel-dwellers. These severe conclusions, drawn by foreign experts brought to South Africa with the approval of the authorities, have had a significant political impact.

32. Disclosures made by a prominent South African pathologist have increased pressure on the authorities to investigate police actions further. In a report published by the South African press in July, Dr. Jonathan Gluckman expressed his conviction that in 90 per cent of the 200 cases of deaths in police custody for which he had performed post-mortems, the prisoners had been killed by the police. 15/ He also stated that he had previously discussed the deaths with high-ranking officials, but that, to his knowledge, no action had been taken. He had finally been prompted into making public allegations by the recent death of a 19-year-old detainee. Reacting to this report, Mr. Hernus J. Kriel, Minister of Law and Order, announced that he had ordered a full investigation into all deaths that had occurred in detention over the past two years. Twelve deaths in custody, however, were reported again during the month of August, bringing the total of such deaths for 1992 to 86. 16/

33. The Security Council convened on 15 and 16 July 1992, at the urgent request of the Group of African States, to consider the question of South Africa, in particular the escalating violence and the breakdown of negotiations. (See also paras. 122-124.)

34. On 7 August 1992, the Secretary-General issued a report to the Security Council based on the findings of his Special Representative for South Africa, Mr. Cyrus Vance. Among the recommendations contained in the report was that the Goldstone Commission should "undertake a series of investigations into the functioning and operations" of the South African army and police, the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), the KwaZulu Police and various independent security firms. 17/ It was also recommended that the United Nations make available observers to serve in South Africa. The Secretary-General's recommendation in his report mandated him to deploy United Nations observers in South Africa. (See also para. 126.)

35. Responding to increased pressure on the Government to investigate police actions and radically reform the police force, Mr. Kriel, Minister of Law and Order, on 27 August announced "sweeping initiatives" aimed at "restoring the credibility of the South African Police (SAP)". The changes included the setting up of a new body to investigate crimes allegedly committed by police; the resignation or early retirement of a total of 18 of the 55 generals in SAP, some of whom could eventually be replaced by Black officers; and the rectification of the discriminatory practices that had previously prevented Black members of the police force from being promoted. ANC described the measures as a "face-lift, not a substantial change", pointing out that many generals suspected of wrongdoing were not included in the list. 18/ On 28 August PAC said that the purging of 13 generals would not cleanse a morally bankrupt police force. A genuine new credible police force could only be brought about by a democratic majority government.

36. On 1 October, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at Geneva announced that the Government of South Africa had agreed to allow the representatives of the organization access to South African police stations.

3. The Ciskei massacre

37. On 7 September, Ciskei forces opened fire on ANC demonstrators marching on Bisho, capital of the homeland, leading to the killing of at least 28 participants. ANC strongly condemned what it described as the "unprovoked killing of unarmed demonstrators" and stated that the responsibility for the massacre lay equally with Brigadier Oupa Gqozo and the South African authorities. 19/ ANC President Nelson Mandela subsequently called for the resignation of Brigadier Gqozo and for an independent inquiry into the shooting. Church leaders, for their part, urged Brigadier Gqozo to submit himself to a referendum. (See also para. 53.)

4. Political prisoners and exiles

38. Besides the violence, a number of other factors have hindered the establishment of a climate of free political activity. Although some 1,000 political prisoners were released in 1991, the release of such prisoners has virtually ceased since the beginning of 1992. The Human Rights Commission in September still listed some 395 political prisoners. More than a year after the deadline agreed in the Pretoria Minute for the release of all political prisoners, therefore, the issue had not been entirely resolved. On the other hand, substantial progress was achieved concerning the return of political exiles. By the end of August 1992, more than 5,200 exiles had returned to South Africa under the auspices of the programme undertaken by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The National Coordinating Committee for the Repatriation of Exiles, for its part, had brought back an additional 7,000 exiles. 20/ However, the number of exiles willing to return was lower than expected, owing in part to the fact that some returnees were subjected to police harassment or even imprisonment, but mostly to poor housing and job prospects as well as the instability and violence prevailing in the country's townships.

39. In his report to the Security Council based on the findings of his Special Representative for South Africa, Mr. Cyrus Vance, the Secretary-General recommended the immediate release of all remaining political prisoners, thus "creating trust and burying the unhappy past". 21/ The visit of Mr. Vance contributed to facilitating a meeting on 28 July 1992 between the Government of South Africa and ANC, which began discussions on the issue of the remaining political prisoners. 22/

40. In response to the Secretary-General's recommendation, the Government of South Africa proposed a blanket amnesty for all crimes committed by both the security forces and anti-apartheid guerrillas before 1990. The proposal would include the release of over 400 remaining political prisoners.

41. ANC rejected the proposal, stressing that an amnesty could only be put in place by a non-racial, democratically elected government and only after such a government had fully investigated, and made public, records of state-committed atrocities. Furthermore, it opposed the linkage of amnesty with the issue of political prisoners, stating that the Government's proposal equated acts of opponents to apartheid with the acts carried out to maintain the system. 23/

42. On 28 September, PAC condemned the South African regime for its plans to introduce legislation in its minority Government by which it would indemnify its own crimes. PAC would not recognize the legislation, which was done unilaterally and with such impunity.

C. Prospects for the process of negotiation

1. Mass action

43. After the second round of talks in CODESA reached an impasse in May 1992, ANC, together with its political allies, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), announced a four-phase mass action plan code-named "Operation Exit". The plan was to encapsulate people's demands for an interim government and an elected constituent assembly.

44. The first phase of the mass action began on 16 June - a day before the Boipatong massacre - and continued until the end of the month, the first deadline set by ANC for a break in the deadlock at CODESA and the creation of the interim government. Following the failure to set up an interim government by that date, the second phase was set in motion on 1 July. During the month of July, mass action remained mostly regional, but simultaneous national actions, such as marches and sit-ins, targeted specific government institutions.

45. The third phase of the mass action plan, which began with a general strike on 3 August, focused on strikes, "stayaways" and civil disobedience. The plan included the occupation of factories by workers and the disruption of the operation of key civil services and communications. Millions of South Africans stayed away from work on 3 and 4 August 1992, in response to the call to strike. Estimates of the number of strikers ranged from 2 million (according to the South African Chamber of Commerce) to 4 million (according to ANC and COSATU). The rate of support for the strike in the workforce was

highest in the Johannesburg area, where up to 90 per cent of workers stayed away from work, while it was lower in Natal, around 55 per cent. 24/ Some sectors, such as the mining industry, were less affected than others. A school boycott was also observed by a majority of students in the townships. ANC and COSATU described the mass action as a "resounding success" and denied allegations that many strikers had been intimidated into staying away from work.

46. The strike was followed on 5 August by demonstrations and marches. The largest one took place in Pretoria, where the President of ANC, Mr. Mandela, addressed over 50,000 supporters who had marched to the Union Buildings. In his speech, Mr. Mandela stated that there would be no progress unless an interim government of national unity was established urgently, and he reiterated that the present Government should commit itself to a democratically elected constituent assembly and to practical steps aimed at curbing the violence. He restated ANC's commitment to the negotiation process. In Cape Town, some 15,000 people marched into the city centre. Overall, some 40 rallies and demonstrations, most of them peaceful, were held nationwide. Police, however, arrested more than 600 demonstrators, mostly for occupying government buildings.

47. The authorities had predicted an outburst of violence during the strike and demonstrations, and had deployed 5,000 police and soldiers in the townships to ensure "peace and stabilization". While there were numerous incidents of violence reported between 2 and 6 August, the rate of politically related deaths during this period did not differ significantly from the previous weeks. This was possibly due, in part, to a "code of conduct" brokered by church leaders between political groups, trade unions, employers and the authorities. The Government also announced on 3 August an indefinite ban on the carrying of dangerous weapons in 20 "unrest areas". According to several observers, the presence of international monitors at the mass action had a deterrent effect on the conduct of all parties and contributed to a relatively peaceful situation, setting a precedent of international monitoring in the country.

48. Nevertheless, a very tense situation developed in the "independent homeland" of Ciskei when Brigadier Oupa Gqozo ordered his police to stop some 20,000 ANC supporters from entering the homeland. He also refused entry to a member of the United Nations monitoring team but, under pressure from the South African authorities, finally allowed a meeting to be held at Bisho, the homeland's capital. Ten United Nations monitors dispatched by the Secretary-General attended marches, rallies and other demonstrations at various locations and, working in collaboration with the National Peace Committee, helped to avert confrontations in the townships of Daveyton and Boipatong. According to several observers, the presence of these and other international monitors had a deterrent effect on the conduct of all parties and contributed to a relatively peaceful situation.

49. The fourth phase of the mass action plan, dubbed "Exit Gate" by ANC organizers, began after the general strike. Its aim was for the Government to relinquish power or at least accept demands for a representative constituent assembly and introduce legislation for the establishment of the transitional executive authority to oversee elections.

2. Contacts between ANC and the Government of South Africa

50. Although formal constitutional negotiations were suspended, contacts between ANC, through its Secretary-General, Mr. Cyril Ramaphosa, and representatives of the Government of South Africa resumed at the end of July 1992. The deadlock, however, could not be broken during these talks, which focused on the issues of political prisoners, as ANC considered that the Government had not answered satisfactorily the 14 demands that it had set in June 1992 as preconditions to negotiations. 25/

51. The ANC National Executive Committee, meeting on 3 September 1992, reiterated its decision not to resume negotiations with the Government until those demands were met, underlining, in particular, the need to deal with the violence and to release political prisoners. It acknowledged, however, that some progress had been achieved during the informal talks, noting that the Government, which "had gone a long way towards accepting the idea of a democratic constituent assembly", had now indicated its support for adequate deadlock-breaking mechanisms and precise time-frames. 26/

52. At the beginning of September, the Government of South Africa convened a multi-party conference, to which it invited "all political parties, political organizacions and government institutions interested in the concept of regional government in a new order". ANC declined to attend this summit on federalism, condemning it as a "National Party alliance-building exercise".

53. The shooting of the demonstrators by the Ciskei forces on 7 September dampened hopes that further concessions by the Government could lead to a prompt resumption of negotiations. President de Klerk condemned both the Ciskei authorities for breaches of the National Peace Accord and ANC for having stepped up its mass action campaign. He accused "prominent communists" within the ANC of making deliberate attempts to further derail the negotiation process. 27/ At the same time, President de Klerk acknowledged that "it was simply not possible to negotiate constitutional issues before the question of violence had been dealt with satisfactorily", and proposed that a high-level meeting be held between the Government and ANC to discuss this issue. He also announced that he would invite all the homeland leaders to an urgent discussion on the control of their security forces.

54. ANC did not reject the idea of a meeting, but indicated that before it could be held, the Government would have to take a number of concrete measures to curb the violence, such as implementing the recommendations of the Goldstone Commission for a ban on dangerous weapons and the fencing of hostels. 28/ ANC also emphasized the need for the remaining political prisoners to be promptly released. 29/ Preparatory talks were held between representatives of ANC and of the Government with a view to reaching an agreement on these crucial issues.

55. A high-level meeting between Mr. Nelson Mandela and Mr. F. W. de Klerk took place on 26 September. It resulted in a Record of Understanding, which, in addition to the release of remaining political prisoners, also reflected agreement on a number of other outstanding issues including those relating to the constitution-making process, to the carrying of and display of dangerous weapons at public occasions and to the fencing and policing of a number of hostels. Some 150 political prisoners had already been released while the remaining prisoners were to be released by 15 November 1992.

56. Following the high-level meeting, ANC announced on 30 September that its National Executive Committee had decided to return to negotiations. However, during the following week Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of IFP, criticized the bilateral meeting between ANC and the Government, stating that IFP rejected some of the agreements reached at the high-level meeting and took the position that IFP was not willing to resume negotiations on the basis of agreements reached between ANC and the Government. The leaders of Bophuthatswana and Ciskei joined the IFP leader in that position.

57. Meanwhile, President de Klerk outlined the draft legislation he was to table at the resumed session of Parliament in October. The legislation would enable him to appoint Blacks to his Cabinet and suspend all Parliamentary by-elections, as well as transfer the functions of "own affairs" departments to general affairs and "rearrange the functions of self-governing States".

3. Exploratory meetings between PAC and the Government of South Africa

58. In August 1992, exploratory talks resumed between the Government of South Africa and PAC. The latter announced that substantive issues such as violence, election of a constituent assembly, the role of the international community, the transitional authority and voter registration would be discussed in October, in a neighbouring country and presided over by a neutral chairman. PAC reiterated that it was not opposed to negotiations, but wanted them to be conducted within a democratic forum that should write a new constitution. The convening of a constituent assembly and an alternative forum for negotiations would be a major issue on the agenda. The Minister of Constitutional Affairs of South Africa, Mr. Roelf Meyer, confirmed that talks would include the demands for a sovereign constitutional assembly. 30/

59. PAC has informed the South African regime that it will not join an "interim government", which it believes co-opts the liberation movements and is based on the principle of "full political responsibility without full political power". PAC supports a transitional authority that impacts directly on the transition to a new order. Some of its duties would be supervision of elections and control of electronic media and security forces. 21/

III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

A. Economic performance

60. Over the past few months, parallel to discussions on constitutional and other issues linked to the political process, an important debate has continued on present and future economic policy options for the country. With the economy still in recession and the continued decline in per capita incomes, there is a growing awareness among major parties that no political compromise will be viable without a simultaneous agreement on the course to be followed to generate new growth while addressing the most urgent socio-economic needs of the majority of the population.

61. Following a negative growth rate of 0.5 per cent of the South African economy in 1991, early forecasts that a positive growth rate of 2 per cent would be achieved in 1992 have had to be drastically revised. It is now envisaged that the economy could register a contraction of 1 per cent in 1992. 31/ Instead of the expected economic upswing, therefore, the recession has deepened, cutting the real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita by an additional 2.7 per cent and widening the gap between actual economic performance and the minimum growth rate needed to prevent further dislocations in the South African society. 32/ This recession, described as the worst suffered by South Africa since 1945, has accentuated the structural incapacity of the country's economy to generate employment. Estimates of the number of unemployed South Africans now range from 1.9 million, according to the Central Statistical Service, to 5.4 million (or 40 per cent of the economically active population), as assessed by the National Manpower Commission. 33/ The mining sector, in particular, has continued to shed jobs, cutting 40,000 of them in 1992. 34/

62. A number of factors account for the persistent weakness of the South African economy. Prominent among them are the political uncertainty and, in particular, the severe effect of township violence on domestic and foreign investor confidence. The Business Confidence Index, calculated by the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB), remains low (it fell from 100 in 1990, the reference year, to 90 in August 1992), reflecting the unfavourable investment climate. 35/ Real gross domestic fixed investment, which declined by 8.5 per cent in 1991, falling both in the private and public sector, was expected to stay depressed throughout 1992 and to fall by as much as 6 per cent in 1992. Consumer spending also remained under pressure. Private consumption expenditure stagnated during 1991 (its growth was only 0.1 per cent) and should rise by only 0.3 to 0.7 per cent in real terms in 1992, as wholesalers and retailers continue to experience poor sales. 36/ Despite higher government spending, which acted as a counterweight to sluggish private consumption, the average level of total real gross domestic expenditure continued to decline in 1991, when it was 0.5 per cent lower than in 1990.

63. Meanwhile, slower than expected recovery in world markets and the poor performance of commodity prices (especially for gold, platinum and ferroalloys) have dampened hopes of a major export-led recovery in South Africa. Merchandise exports did increase in 1991, but only by 3.5 per cent in volume. However, this increase, combined with a weak demand for imports, has led to a further improvement in the current account surplus, which reached R7.4 billion in 1991. 37/

64. The impact on the balance of payments, and on the economy in general, of the worst drought in decades to affect southern Africa has yet to be fully comprehended. According to the South African Agricultural Union, recent crop estimates indicate that less than a fourth of the normal volume of agricultural production could be achieved in the summer rainfall areas, the grain producers being most affected. As a result, the country will have to import more than 5 million tons of maize (at a cost of R3 billion) and probably 1 million tons of wheat. The crisis in terms of unemployment and further migration to the towns, however, is more important than the effect on the balance of payments. Although now contributing to the GDP by only 4 to 6 per cent, the commercial agriculture sector provides employment for about 1.2 million farm workers, who in turn support some 5 million dependants. Agriculture has remained an important component of the South African economy with strong linkages to other sectors. According to some estimates, those linkages have created employment for approximately 30 per cent of employees in the service and manufacturing sectors of the economy. 38/ The decline in GDP resulting from the drought, therefore, could be at least 1 or 1.5 per cent.

65. Little progress was achieved over the past few months in countering the high rate of inflation, which rose to 15.3 per cent in 1991. Inertia and accommodation to inflationary expectations seem to be playing an increasing role, independently of the real state of the economy. For some observers, however, the slower increase in the Producer Price Index (which rose by 11.4 per cent in 1991) indicates a more encouraging underlying trend, and they forecast an overall inflation rate for 1992 of no more than 14 per cent. Failure by the Consumer Price Index to reflect that trend can be attributed, inter alia, to soaring food prices as well as the imposition of the value added tax (VAT). Food prices increased by 28.8 per cent in the year ending in March 1992. 39/ While the drought and the need to import many basic foodstuffs have partly contributed to the increase, an investigation has been launched into the pricing practices of major food retailers.

66. The Government of South Africa continues to emphasize control of inflation and money supply in its macroeconomic policy. The objective of 10 per cent set for the rate of expansion of the money supply in 1992 indicates that a relatively restrictive monetary policy will be pursued. Commitment to fiscal discipline, however, appears to have weakened as the deficit before borrowing is projected at R15.9 billion or 4.5 per cent of GDP for the 1992/93 budget. The deficit for 1991/92, initially projected at 3 per cent of GDP, reached 4.7 per cent of GDP. 40/ According to more recent forecasts, the deficit for 1992/93 could actually reach R20 billion as a result of a combined sharp rise in spending and lower than expected revenue.

67. The present budget, therefore, while still governed by the precept of "Equity through Growth and Stability" first set forth in 1991/92, has a slight expansionary element. On the spending side, total government expenditure is projected at R100.7 billion, which represents an increase of 2 per cent in real terms. In particular, the share allocated to social spending continues to increase; it now accounts for more than two fifths of total expenditure and includes important increases in spending on education (24 per cent) and health services (22 per cent). More than R2 billion will be made available for housing through various schemes. Other social expenditure includes the allocation of R1 billion each on a drought disaster reserve (which was later expanded to R3.8 billion) and on narrowing by 40 per cent the gap in pensions paid to the different racial groups. As in 1991/92, a large part of the funds

made available by a limited allocation of R9.7 billion to SADF (a 5.6 per cent increase in nominal terms but a 7.5 per cent decrease in real terms) is to be re-channelled towards the police. A total sum of R5.6 billion is thus allocated to policing, correctional services and the administration of justice. While the increased spending on social services will only marginally assist the most disadvantaged sectors of the population, many observers, including the Auditor-General, have expressed concern at the State's wastefulness and at the limited positive effect of government spending, much of which is considered to be unproductively absorbed in a bloated and corrupt civil service. 41/

68. The main burden of financing the supplementary revenue (budgeted at R84.8 billion) falls again on individual taxpayers, mostly through fiscal drag. However, some tax relief will be provided to those middle and lower income taxpayers who are more exposed to fiscal drag. As a whole, individual income tax has risen by 54 per cent in two years. The top marginal rate of income tax remains 43 per cent. Individuals will also be affected by higher levies on petrol and diesel. Fiscal concessions previously granted to corporations such as the reduction in the import surcharge, the VAT rebate on capital and intermediate goods and the 48 per cent company tax rate are still in effect, and some additional incentives have been offered for industrial investment.

69. The VAT, introduced on 30 September 1991, has so far failed to generate the additional revenue expected by the authorities, owing in part to their decision to reduce its rate from 12 to 10 per cent. At the beginning of April 1992, the Government reversed its decision to lift the temporary exemption from VAT on a number of basic foodstuffs, thus avoiding another major confrontation similar to the two-day strike held in November 1991 by COSATU and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU). However, it did lift the exemption on rice and fresh milk. The VAT Coordination Committee, set up to coordinate efforts aimed at countering the imposition of VAT, welcomed the extension of the exemption on other basic foodstuffs but criticized the Government's failure to adopt a comprehensive poverty relief programme.

70. Imposition of VAT is one of the items at the core of the debate presently conducted in South Africa on development policy and options for the macroeconomic management of the country. Early in 1992, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released an occasional paper entitled Economic Policies for a New South Africa, in which it was stated:

> "The urgent need to raise living standards and improve the distribution of income and wealth in South Africa poses a major challenge to policy makers over the medium term. Unless the rate of economic growth rises to a level well above that of the last decade, there is little prospect for reducing the current very high level of underemployment in the economy or for generating the resources needed to address social needs on a sustained basis." 42/

A large degree of consensus has been reached on the need to address urgently the socio-economic needs of the Black majority and to promote investment in new productive capacity in order to stimulate growth and job creation. Views still differ, however, on the cost and means of achieving these objectives. Proponents of a restructuring of the demand side, most of them from the

democratic movement, continue to call for a far-reaching redistribution of wealth, which, they argue, would stimulate growth. They assert, in particular, that the growth process needs to be prodded by large-scale provision of physical infrastructure, such as mass housing and electrification. 43/ However, some economists, as well as IMF and the World Bank, warn that "there is little scope for kick-starting the economy into a quick recovery by, for example, using expansionary fiscal policy to stimulate domestic demand" and that public spending that does not fall within a sound macroeconomic framework can swiftly become self-defeating. 44/ They advocate, instead, a major restructuring of the supply side of the economy.

71. At its first policy conference, held at Johannesburg in May, ANC adopted a comprehensive set of policy guidelines. While emphasizing affirmative action and reallocation of resources to correct the racial disparities engendered by apartheid, the guidelines reflect a more pragmatic approach of economic policy by ANC, rejecting any "rigid ideological framework". In particular, the document indicated a general shift in the stance of the movement on the question of public ownership and nationalization, and stressed that "the primary question was not the legal form that the state involvement in economic activity might take", but whether such actions would "strengthen the ability of the economy to respond to the massive inequalities in the country and stimulate economic growth and competitiveness". 45/ Nationalization would be but one option for governmental intervention; other options include purchasing shareholding in companies, establishing joint ventures with the private sector or even reducing the role of the public sector through privatization. While the document was generally welcomed in the business sector, it did draw some criticism for its proposed principle of "national treatment" to be applied to foreign investors, who could be blocked from investing in certain strategic areas and would have limits placed on their local borrowing facilities.

72. The notion of a national economic forum, where the respective merits of various options for economic policy could be debated, gained wider acceptance at the beginning of 1992. On 31 March, the largest labour federations, including COSATU and NACTU, and key business representatives reached an agreement for the setting up of such a forum. The following day, the signatories presented their joint initiative to the Government, describing the economic forum as a "consensus-geared cooperative body to deal with economic and related socio-economic issues", which would "provide a mechanism through which economic shareholders can address the economic challenges facing the country". While the Government of South Africa had, at first, shown reluctance to participate in the forum, Mr. Derek Keys, appointed Finance Minister following Mr. Barend du Plessis' resignation in April, has expressed support for the initiative. The agreement reached in this matter between labour and business representatives was an important step towards achieving political consensus on a future economic policy for South Africa. However, failure by the same representatives to adopt, in July, a joint Charter for Peace, Democracy and Economic Reconstruction, and thus prevent further industrial unrest, soured the relations between labour and business organizations.

B. Socio-economic inequalities

73. With the worsening of the unemployment prospects in South Africa, the pursuing of a constructive dialogue between the major unions, business organizations and the authorities is crucial. In its latest Race Relations Survey, the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) estimated that an average of 450,000 persons would join the labour market annually over the next 15 years. SAIRR stated that the number of South Africans formally unemployed could thus reach 8 million people before the end of the decade. 46/ It should be noted that up to 3.5 million of the formally unemployed are at present active in the informal sector, which contributes some 7 per cent of GDP. 47/ Nevertheless, the continued incapacity of the South African educational and training system to answer the needs of the country's economy should result in a shortage of 103,000 managers and 442,000 skilled workers by 2000. 46/

74. Negotiations between labour organizations and the Department of Manpower have not made significant progress during the period under review, as the announced restructuration of the National Manpower Commission (NMC) has not yet taken place. Delays have also occurred, which have prevented the implementation of recommendations for the extension of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, the Unemployment Insurance Act and the Wage Act to farm and domestic workers. Farm workers, therefore, are still without basic legal protection, at a time when many of them are being retrenched because of the drought. Reporting on these issues in May, a Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission set up by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (see also para. 127) stated that the continued exclusion of farm and domestic workers from the labour statutes "poses one of the most serious problems affecting freedom of association in South Africa". The Commission also recommended that protective labour legislation be extended to workers in the homelands. 48/

75. In June, a ground-breaking agreement on labour relations, including a code of conduct and new dismissal and dispute procedures, was signed between the Anglo-American Corporation and the National Union of Mineworkers. In most other cases, bargaining between labour and employers' representatives has been characterized in 1992 by settlements for lower wage increments, as unions tended to focus their demands on working conditions and issues related to job security. Wage negotiations have resulted, on average, in a 12 per cent increase, several points below the inflation rate and, especially, below the increase in the rate of food prices. 49/

76. A growing number of South Africans - 2.5 million according to the relief organization Operation Hunger - cannot afford to pay for their basic nutritional needs. 50/ The poverty relief programmes set up by the Government have not been sufficient to check the spread of poverty throughout the country. Operation Hunger estimates that only 8 per cent of rural Blacks are self-sufficient, while the others must rely on remittances from relatives working in the cities. IMF noted, for its part, that in terms of social indicators such as life expectancy and infant mortality, "Black South Africa has done at best only moderately better than its neighbours despite its proximity to Africa's most dynamic economy". 42/ For the first time since the 1930s, poverty and unemployment are even affecting a number of White South Africans.

77. Meanwhile, and in spite of the allocation in the last budget of increased funds to social services for Blacks, important discrepancies persist in the services available to the different racial groups. In particular, White pensioners now receive R345 per month, while Black pensioners only receive R293. 51/ Disparities also remain in the funds earmarked for the education of Black and White children. While overall spending on education is to increase by 24 per cent in 1992/93, thus reaching 5.4 per cent of GDP, and although most of this increase is to be allotted to Black education, the Government still devotes 35 per cent of its global education expenditure to White children. 52/

78. The low scores achieved once again at the end of 1991 by Black students presenting the matriculation examination (39.2 per cent of them passed the examination, a slight improvement only on the previous rate of 36.4 per cent) illustrate the continuing crisis of Black education, which is still affected by a severe shortage of basic materials and qualified teachers. More organizations and parties, acknowledging that an increase in funds alone will not suffice to alter learning conditions significantly for Black South Africans, have joined the call for a unitary, non-racial education system. In February 1992, the Government announced further reforms, whereby most White schools would opt for a new, semi-private status. Under this new model, the Government would only finance teachers' salaries, while students' parents would pay for maintenance and general administrative costs. Many educationists have denounced this trend towards privatization as a new attempt to keep Black children out of White schools. 53/

79. The new emphasis placed by the Government since 1990 on the provision of primary health care has not yet resulted in an improvement of the health status of most South Africans. In fact, with a serious shortage in funds and the continued de facto segregation of most medical facilities, South Africa faces, in the words of the Director-General of National Health and Population, a "quiet catastrophe as child mortality rates continue to soar and nutritional problems worsen". 46/ The allocation of funds to primary health care, in the 1992/93 budget, does not reflect the declared shift in emphasis, as these funds have increased by only 15 per cent, while those allocated to overall health services have increased by 22 per cent. ANC has called for a moratorium on any health restructuring, including new budget allocations and building of clinics, until a forum with all the key players is set up to develop a new health policy. 54/

80. The Government has recently focused more attention and devoted more funds to reducing the housing backlog. More than R2 billion was made available in the last budget for housing and urban infrastructure, and an additional R1.1 billion is to be spent on housing schemes, such as the one set up by the Independent Development Trust. This increased allocation, however, will not be sufficient to cover the needs estimated by the South African Housing Advisory Board, which published a comprehensive report in May 1992. According to the Board, over the next 10 years, 198,000 shelters will be required annually for new households and 130,000 to cover the backlog. The report calls for a complete overhaul and rationalization of the existing subsidy schemes and the merging of White and Black local authorities. It also recommends the creation of a central national housing department. 52/ The issue of housing has become the focus of intense political and economic debates, as several of the scenarios suggested to "kick-start" the South

African economy involve heavy investments in the housing and electrification sectors. The recent setting up of a National Housing Forum could assist in defining a new housing policy.

81. Little progress has been achieved during the past few months in addressing the problem of redistribution of land. The impact of the drought has further complicated the issue, as thousands of White farmers are no longer able to contend with huge debts. A year after the repeal of the major apartheid laws, therefore, the impact of political changes has yet to be felt by the majority of South Africans, whose living conditions continue to deteriorate rapidly.

IV. EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA

A. Diplomatic relations

82. During the period under review, the diplomatic isolation of South Africa continued to lessen as more Member States decided to establish diplomatic ties with Pretoria. The convening of CODESA in December 1991 was viewed as evidence of the start of genuine negotiations towards a new South Africa. The positive outcome of the March 1992 Whites-only referendum was also welcomed by most members of the international community and triggered the relaxation of numerous sanctions.

83. While the General Assembly, in its resolution 46/79 A of 13 December 1991, called for the qualified resumption of academic, scientific, cultural and sports links with South Africa, a number of countries hastened to lift other restrictive measures, such as the ones on trade (see sect. V.C of the present report). However, following the deadlock at CODESA II in May 1992 and perhaps more importantly, the massacre in the township of Boipatong on 17 June 1992, the initial enthusiasm generated in the international community by previous reforms changed to wariness. A number of Member States and cities that had been preparing to lift their sanctions decided to put such plans on hold.

84. An important aspect of South Africa's increased diplomatic activity was the extensive travel undertaken by President de Klerk in 1992 and the warmth of the reception awaiting him in most cases. In late January, he went on a six-nation tour to Eastern and Western Europe, which included official visits to Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. In this regard, Poland agreed to support South Africa's bid for readmission to the United Nations. 55/ President de Klerk also went to Paris, where he shared with Mr. Nelson Mandela the Félix Houphouët-Boigny Prize for Peace, awarded by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). On a private visit to London, he met with Mr. John Major, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In June, he undertook official visits to the Russian Federation, Japan and Singapore. Furthermore, President de Klerk also went to Seville, Spain, where South Africa had a pavilion at Expo 92.

85. Politically, the most significant trip undertaken by President de Klerk during the period was his visit to Abuja in April. The visit could also lead to important economic results as South African officials have identified Nigeria as a vital economic hub in Africa. 56/ The President of Kenya, Mr. Daniel arap Moi, became, in June, the first African head of State to visit South Africa in 21 years. 57/

86. Since Mr. F. W. de Klerk assumed the presidency in 1989, the number of South African offices abroad has increased from 45 to 70. 58/ The decision of Côte d'Ivoire to open an embassy in Pretoria made Abidjan the first African capital to exchange ambassadors with Pretoria since Malawi did so more than a quarter of a century ago. 59/ Lesotho followed by establishing ties at ambassadorial level. These were considered diplomatic rewards brought about by the start of CODESA negotiations and the referendum victory. South Africa has consular offices/trade missions or representative offices in some 20 other African countries. 60/

87. Most western countries had maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa even during the years of isolation. In Eastern Europe, diplomatic relations now exist with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. While South Africa initially focused its attention westward, it has lately looked towards entering the Pacific region. Diplomatic ties have now been opened with Japan, Taiwan, Province of China, Thailand and Singapore. Although South Africa has achieved only limited success in the Middle East, where Israel remains South Africa's long-standing diplomatic ally, contacts have been established with Bahrain, Dubai (United Arab Emirates), the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon. Moreover, a large number of countries have established interest sections in other embassies in Pretoria.

B. Trade and finance

88. The past two years have seen South Africa's reintegration into the mainstream of world trade proceed at an even faster pace than the restoration of its diplomatic ties. Potential local and foreign investors have shown interest in the South African economy, especially in the early months of 1992, before the breakdown in political negotiations.

89. With a number of countries relaxing restrictive measures on trade as well as exploring the possibilities of establishing business operations in South Africa and the region as a whole, a significant list of inward- and outward-bound trade missions have held trade talks with the Government of South Africa and business officials. A trade agreement was signed with Italy (the Economic and Industrial Cooperation Agreement), the first such agreement with a major European Power. As France lifted coal sanctions, major collaboration agreements with French companies were reportedly negotiated, including deals in the hotel and transport field. 61/ South Africa offered the Russian Federation a R140 million revolving credit link to facilitate expanding trade between the two countries. 62/ The Barlows Equipment Co. of South Africa has been contracted to supply mining equipment for the Luzamba project, a diamond venture in Angola, the biggest trade deal between the two countries. 63/

90. The South African Foreign Trade Organization (SAFTO) estimates that even during the height of sanctions trade between South Africa and the rest of Africa was worth R2 billion a year. This trade grew significantly during the past two years and is expected to show exponential growth as political barriers disappear. The reform process in South Africa has prompted the formation of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), to replace the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), set up in 1980 to reduce dependence on South Africa. The new SADC is set to expand its role, which now includes a tighter unity in economic policies, regional security, foreign affairs and security issues. However, while there is big potential for South Africa in the African markets, its main trading partners remain the world's largest economies (Germany, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy). Trade with these countries dwarfs trade with Africa, which was estimated at R10 billion in 1991. South Africa's total visible trade in 1991 was R114 billion. 51/

91. South African exports continued to perform well during the first quarter of 1992, with a gain of 7 per cent during the first two months of the year,

despite the sluggish economic environment, which has depressed base and precious metal prices, South Africa's major export commodities. The biggest contributor to the export growth was the jewellery and precious stone category (mainly diamonds), which rose by 79 per cent during the first quarter. Exports of manufactured products also increased, by 21 per cent in 1991. The Reserve Bank attributes this to a more competitive exchange rate and producers seeking alternative outlets for their products on account of the weak domestic demand.

92. Consistent with the recessionary conditions in the South African economy, imports of industrial materials remained relatively static. Imports of chemical goods increased by only 5 per cent and base metals, 6 per cent. 64/ In the past seven years, South Africa's total export of goods and services has exceeded total imports, resulting in sustained favourable performance of the current account of the balance of payments. The current account surplus reached R7.4 billion, or 2.5 per cent of GDP, in 1991. However, the surplus figure declined to a seasonally adjusted and annualized figure of R4.5 billion in the first quarter of 1992 and R6.0 billion in the second quarter. As economic sanctions were lifted, international banks and investors re-established business relations with South Africa, thus significantly improving the capital account of the balance of payments. In the first quarter of 1992, the total net outflow of capital declined to a negligible R21 million. However, the total net outflow increased to R1.9 billion in the second quarter, as a negative reaction to adverse political developments. 40/

93. Following South Africa's successful re-entry into world capital markets in September 1991, when South Africa raised DM 400 million with a five-year issue lead-managed by the Deutsche Bank (Germany), the Government of South Africa announced, in January, that it was raising an ECU 250 million (R890 million) bond issue involving some 19 European banks. 65/ In February, the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) issued a DM 200 million Eurobond led by another German bank. 66/ ESKOM, the South African electricity utility, raised DM 300 million when it launched its first public issue in the international bond market. 67/ Another bond issue proposed by ESKOM in August 1992 was postponed after ANC appealed to major financial institutions in Europe and the Far East to keep financial sanctions in place. 68/ The return of South African borrowers to international financial markets has generated a great deal of controversy linked to the opposition of ANC, but also to the assertion by some economists that South Africa's recent bond issues were very expensive and not necessary because local borrowing would have been sufficient to finance the budget. 69/

94. To stimulate tourism and trade links further, South Africa has announced a liberalization of its international aviation policy, including the possible relaxation of tariff control measures. 70/

95. While traders have clearly manifested their interest in South Africa, the hope for significant foreign investment remains unfulfilled. In a move to encourage such investments, the Minister of Finance announced in June 1992 that foreign companies and individuals would no longer pay tax on interest accrued on their investment in South Africa. 71/ ANC, meanwhile, has maintained that the most important way to promote foreign investment remains the establishment of a climate of political stability, economic growth and transparent, consistent, economic policies.

C. Military matters

1. Defence expenditure

96. The defence budget for the years 1992-1993 was estimated at R9.7 billion, which represented less than 10 per cent of total state spending. It showed a relative reduction in comparison with 11 per cent for the years 1990-1991. Although declining, at 4.3 per cent of gross national product (GNP), South Africa's military expenditure was still above the targeted 3.6 per cent of GNP. 72/

97. As part of the ongoing restructuring and privatization of the South African arms industry, the South African Arms Corporation (ARMSCOR) has reorganized its manufacturing subsidiaries into the Denel Group. 73/ The Atlas Aircraft Corporation, now under the name SIMERA, was also reported to have been reorganized in a similar manner. While Paratus, the official monthly of SADF, reported that the purpose of the changes was that certain technical capabilities which South Africa had built would be retained, 74/ the management of Denel has indicated that the aim was the conversion from a predominantly military production (85 per cent of the present production) to the manufacture for mainly civilian markets (70 per cent of the production by 1997). The United States was reported to have offered to assist Denel in its conversion to civilian production. 75/ The reorganization has been criticized both on the grounds that Denel, would continue to depend on government support and that it would use taxpayer's money to compete with other private enterprises on a small electronics market where it was not likely to succeed. The ongoing privatization has also been criticized as "state asset stripping" prior to the establishment of new non-racial government. 76/

98. Concerned at the dual use potential of the technology involved, the United States Administration was also reported to have opposed South Africa's efforts to build and launch space satellites. It was reported that Houwteq, a Denel subsidiary, was developing a satellite and launching capability that could be ready within five years. Some evidence also suggests that South Africa had already developed various components for satellites, including super-light titanium fuel tanks for launching rockets, extra strong but extremely light composite materials used in building "caskets" for equipment, compact imaging equipment, small telemetry and avionic guidance systems, and positioning equipment to control satellites in flight. 77/

2. South Africa's imports of arms and equipment

99. It was reported that the South African Air Force (SAAF) was going to modernize its Douglas C-47 Dakotas by replacing old engines with Pratt and Whitney Canada PT-6 engines, 78/ and was planning to install MIG-29 engines in its French Mirage fighters. 79/ According to Anti-Apartheid News (London), SAAF was conducting tests on the Russian Klimov RD-33 jet engine, which powers the MIG-29 Fulcrum. 80/

100. On the other hand, The Independent of London reported on 23 June 1992 that South Africa, according to government sources in Moscow, had made concrete inquiries about buying a number of MIG-29 Fulcrum fighters from the Russian arms stockpile. The paper referred to an interview in the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta with Alexander Temerko, the official in charge of selling off surplus material, in which he expressed the hope of bringing in $20 billion

taking into account potential buyers such as South Africa and other countries. The same government sources indicated that South Africa was interested in buying MIG-29s to replace its ageing French Mirage fighters. 81/ The representative of the Russian Federation informed the Chairman of the Special Committee that the preceding media information was based on unreliable press information; that an investigation of those media allegations had been conducted by his Government, as a result of which no evidence of cooperation between the Russian Federation and South Africa had been found in military and technological fields; and that the Russian Federation was building its relations with South Africa in full conformity with mandatory Security Council resolutions, including resolution 421 (1977) by which an embargo on military collaboration with South Africa had been established.

101. According to another newspaper report, the Brazilian aircraft company Embraer had engaged in negotiations for selling 40 Brazilian Embraer Tucano EMB 312 aircraft to SADF, a deal that was estimated at $250 million. 82/ The aircraft has been designed and intended for military training. Brazilian test pilots were reported to have flown an EMB 312 Tucano military trainer from Sao Paolo to South Africa earlier in 1992.

102. The Special Committee, in previous reports, has referred to a United States-based company, International Signal Control (ISC), owned by the British firm Ferranti. During the reporting period, its Chairman, Mr. James Guerin, was sentenced to a prison term of 15 years, inter alia, for illegally exporting military technology (reported to be missile testing and anti-aircraft systems) to South Africa. 83/ The Wall Street Journal reported that the prosecutors of the case had stated that the South African authorities had tried to impede the investigation by offering asylum to four persons charged with involvement in the case, and by rejecting requests for assistance with regard to other defendants in the case. The South African authorities had also refused to respond to a federal indictment against ARMSCOR. 84/ This case is also reported to have been of concern in the context of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) group. The group now consists of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 85/

103. It was also reported that the United States Government was investigating whether companies had submitted forged documents or other incorrect information in order to supply South Africa with United States arms that were claimed to be intended for other destinations in southern Africa. An anti-apartheid group based in New York, Africa Fund, demanded in a suit that the Commerce Department release more than 1,000 pages of documents that the Fund believed contained information relating to illegal arms transactions. According to Africa Fund, millions of dollars worth of shotguns, cartridge-reloading equipment, airgun pellets, ammunition and other arms packed in pallets left United States ports between 1989 and 1991 for ports in South Africa and other neighbouring countries. The Fund executives stated that they had alerted the Department of Commerce in November 1990 about the alleged arms exports. They also asserted that sawn-off shotguns, originally manufactured by American companies, were showing up at sites of violence around South Africa. 86/ According to The New York Times, the Assistant United States Attorney whose office was investigating whether arms were illegally transferred to South Africa had objected to the release by the Commerce Department of the documentation in question. 87/

3. Export of arms and ammunition from South Africa

104. Business Day (Johannesburg), of 18 February 1992 reported that Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates) and Qatar had ordered more than 90 155 mm G5 and G6 self-propelled howitzers from ARMSCOR. The orders were estimated at $276 million. The price of a G6 is about $3 million. Abu Dhabi was reported to have placed an order for 80 G6s, while Qatar was reported to have ordered 12 G5s.

105. The Sunday Star (Johannesburg) of 2 February 1992 reported that South African arms had been found in Northern Ireland. The paper stated that "despite security force success in seizing most of the shipments, South African arms are still used to kill Catholic activists".

4. Other military-related issues

106. On 1 April 1992, the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee addressed a letter to the Permanent Representative of Chile expressing the concern of the Special Committee at the participation of South Africa in the FIDAE '92 air exhibition, held at the Chilean Los Cerrillos Air Force base near Santiago. The Permanent Representative of Chile, in a letter dated 6 April, acknowledged the letter and stated that the concern of the Special Committee had been conveyed to his Government.

107. On 6 April, the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee also addressed letters to the Permanent Representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Russian Federation concerning the participation of companies in their respective countries with the South African companies Atlas and Kentron, in promoting jet fighters and related technology at the Aviation Africa '92 Aerospace Trade Fair at Johannesburg. The Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, in a letter dated 24 April, stated that neither fighter aircraft nor any other military technology connected with such aircraft had been exhibited at the show. He emphasized that the Russian Federation "remains committed to the cause of the final elimination of apartheid and the creation of a non-racial democratic South Africa and complies with United Nations resolutions aimed at the early attainment of those goals". In a letter dated 30 April, the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia stated that:

> "Czechoslovakia complies, and will continue doing so, with the unanimously adopted United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/79 as well as with the obligatory military embargo set by United Nations Security Council resolution 418 (1977).
>
> "In the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic the only authorized body for issuing licences for foreign trade activities related to arms and military technology exports is the Council of State Defence headed by the Prime Minister of the Federal Government. It is impossible to prevent informal meetings of Czechoslovak firms with foreign subjects, as might have been the case of the Atlas and Kenton firms from South Africa, as the State cannot determine whom Czechoslovak firms may or must not contact. Even though such contact happens, in no case can the

Czechoslovak party voluntarily violate the mandate sanctions of the United Nations in the field of arms, as none of the Czechoslovak firms gets the licence for such activities from the Council of State Defence. And without such a licence no arms or military technology exports from Czechoslovakia are possible."

108. On 9 September 1992, the Acting Chairman of the Special Committee addressed a letter to the Permanent Representative of Brazil, expressing concern about reports that SADF had decided to purchase approximately 40 Brazilian EMB 312 aircraft. In a letter dated 16 October 1992, the Permanent Representative of Brazil stated the following:

"2. EMBRAER did consider the possibility of selling Tucano aircraft to the Government of South Africa. However, such transaction was only to be carried out on condition that the aircraft would be configured to be used exclusively as pilot trainers, without any possibility of their conversion for military use. This would imply the removal from the aircraft of those parts and fittings that could permit its adaptation for non-civilian use.

"3. The contract for the supply of trainer aircraft in the international bidding opened by the Government of South Africa was not awarded to EMBRAER.

"4. The Brazilian Government carefully monitored EMBRAER's efforts at the South African market. EMBRAER was informed by the Brazilian Government that no military or related material could be sold to South Africa. There was no question of circumventing the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council, which are duly enshrined in Brazilian domestic legislation, according to which all transactions of a non-civilian nature with South Africa are prohibited."

5. Nuclear issues

109. In the wake of satellite observations in the late 1970s indicating the existence of what appeared to be an underground nuclear-weapon-test site in the Kalahari Desert and of flashes indicative of a nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic, a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General concluded, in a study entitled South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field (1980), that:

"It cannot be doubted that, had it decided to do so, South Africa by mid-1979 could have produced sufficient weapon-grade uranium for at least a few nuclear weapons. ... There is no reason to doubt the broadly accepted conclusion that South Africa is capable of constructing a first generation fission weapon of moderately sophisticated design." 88/

Two subsequent reports supported the conclusions that South Africa continued to receive foreign nuclear technology and to expand its supplies of fissile materials, increasing its nuclear-weapon capability. By the late 1980s, South Africa's diversified and technologically sophisticated nuclear establishment is considered largely to have accomplished the goal of developing a complete

nuclear fuel cycle, fully under national control and mostly free of international safeguards and inspections.

110. A panel of consultant experts appointed by the Secretary-General observed, in a report issued on 29 October 1990 (A/45/571, annex, para. 32), that Western Governments had responded unilaterally to growing concern, by severing their relationships with South Africa in the nuclear field and that the United States, after having halted sales of nuclear fuel in 1975, had terminated all nuclear commerce with South Africa in 1980. This was followed by a stronger nuclear embargo measure passed by the United States Congress in 1986. In the mid-1980s nuclear embargoes were also agreed by the Commonwealth nations, with the exception of the United Kingdom, and by the European Community (EC). In July 1985, France, previously South Africa's leading nuclear supplier, announced that it would not approve new nuclear agreements.

111. In the above-mentioned report, the panel of experts noted that although the United Nations embargo and international sanctions had virtually eliminated South Africa's ability to acquire major nuclear technologies, smaller items and know-how continued to reach the country. An example of this was a fuel-fabrication measurement device that had been transferred illegally by a firm from the Federal Republic of Germany. The United States discovery that its Department of Energy had, through lax security procedures, given information on detonators and explosives with possible nuclear applications to citizens of several nuclear threshold States, including South Africa, was another example (A/45/571, annex, para. 55).

112. With an estimated maximum annual output of approximately 50 kg of 45 per cent enriched U-235, the Valindaba Pilot-Scale enrichment facility outside Pretoria has been at the centre of discussions of South Africa's nuclear capabilities, since 45 per cent enriched uranium can be used directly to manufacture nuclear weapons, and 50 kg are considerably in excess of the 14 kg enriched uranium needed annually for the operation of the SAFARI-I research reactor.

113. Although the South African Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) decided, in February 1990, to close down the Pilot-Scale facility for economic reasons, some analysts maintain that the jet nozzle enrichment process used at its Valindaba Commercial-Scale facility, capable of generating up to 50,000 kg of 3.25 per cent enriched uranium annually, could be adapted to achieving higher degrees of enrichment without extensive modification of facilities. In the report referred to above, the Secretary-General observed that if that were the case, South Africa might retain the potential to produce more weapon-grade uranium (A/45/571, annex, para. 39).

114. The report estimates that until the closure of the Valindaba Pilot-Scale facility, a total of some 450 kg of 45 per cent enriched uranium could have been produced since January 1981. Setting aside 126 kg for the operation of SAFARI-I, a stockpile of as much as 324 kg could therefore have been accumulated (A/45/571, annex, para. 49). Based on the calculation that, at a 45 per cent enrichment level, 55 kg are required to attain critical mass, and with access to beryllium, the report concludes that a total of approximately five or six nuclear weapons could be assembled. It also states that with an annual requirement of 14 kg for the operation of SAFARI-I, the weapon-grade maximum stockpile would diminish until the research reactor is decommissioned

or alternative supplies of fuel are found (ibid., para. 51). With regard to this, the 1990 report observes that the Valindaba Commercial-Scale facility, if it can be modified, would be a cause of concern since it is not safeguarded (ibid., para. 53).

115. In a letter dated 15 October 1991, the Permanent Representative of Nigeria transmitted to the Secretary-General a report from a meeting of experts to examine the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of a treaty on the denuclearization of Africa, which took place at the general secretariat of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at Addis Ababa from 6 to 10 May 1991. In the report, the experts stated that Africa should endeavour to take advantage of the progress made in the field of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, the lessening of East-West tensions and the development of the situation in South Africa, to implement the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at Cairo in 1964. In that context, the experts stressed the absolute need for South Africa to be subjected to the obligations deriving from Africa's status as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It was therefore necessary not only to ensure that no nuclear weapons were introduced but also that those in South Africa's possession were destroyed. To that end, the experts considered that South Africa must comply with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and the decisions relating to it, in particular by signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and by submitting all its nuclear activities to full International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. South Africa has expressed support for the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

116. Following the deposition, on 10 July 1991, by South Africa of its instrument of accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Government of South Africa signed, on 16 September 1991, a Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. The Agreement entered into force the same day. The Safeguards Agreement provides for IAEA inspections with respect to source or special fissionable material, whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside of any such facility. Such inspections, as an ongoing process, have started.

117. As requested by the General Conference of IAEA in its resolution GC(XXXV)/RES/567 of 20 September 1991, 89/ the Director-General submitted on 4 September 1992 to the General Conference a report on the completeness of the inventory of South Africa's nuclear installations and material. 90/ The report, reflecting findings of the ongoing inspection process, stated, inter alia, that on the basis of visits and information made available to the inspection team, no evidence was found that the list of facilities and locations outside facilities provided by South Africa in its initial report, as required by the Safeguards Agreement, was incomplete. Observing that the IAEA secretariat was not in possession of any other information suggesting the existence of any undeclared facilities or nuclear material, the report stated that if relevant information were obtained suggesting the need for access to any facilities, locations or data, the Agency would request such access. 91/

118. At its thirty-sixth regular session, which took place from 21 to 25 September at Vienna, the General Conference of IAEA adopted resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/577 on South Africa's nuclear capabilities, 92/ in which it

requested South Africa to continue to cooperate with the Agency in the implemention of the Safeguards Agreement. It also requested the Director-General of the Agency to assist the African States in their efforts towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and to report on the progress made in "the denuclearization of Africa" to the Board of Governors of IAEA and the General Conference.

119. South Africa has resumed its participation in the proceedings of the policy-making organs of IAEA.

V. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

120. The international community has endeavoured to respond appropriately to the process in South Africa, by applying a phased lifting of sanctions in accordance with specific progress made towards substantive negotiations. The start of negotiations in the framework of CODESA, as well as the support expressed by White South Africans for the efforts of President F. W. de Klerk to dismantle apartheid, were viewed by many Governments as encouraging evidence that a democratic process was under way. The trend towards the relaxation of restrictive measures has continued, enabling South Africa to expand its trade and diplomatic relations with a number of countries. South Africa's participation in the Barcelona Olympics, in September 1992, signalled the end of South Africa's isolation in sports. Sports and cultural links with the rest of the world have significantly increased in the past 12 months. However, the breakdown in negotiations and the continued political violence in the townships have, to a large extent, delayed the normalization of relations with South Africa. International organizations, including the United Nations, have decided to intervene more actively in order to prevent a collapse of the process of peaceful transition. Anti-apartheid movements and other organizations have also pursued a two-pronged approach to South Africa, with campaigns to maintain appropriate pressure on the authorities and efforts to facilitate the present process, as well as plans to assist a future democratic South Africa.

A. United Nations action

121. In its resolution 46/79 A of 13 December 1991, entitled "International efforts towards the total eradication of apartheid and support for the establishment of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa", which was adopted without a vote, the General Assembly reaffirmed the provisions of the 1989 Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa, and the need for their full and immediate implementation. The Assembly also called upon the international community to resume academic, scientific and cultural links with democratic anti-apartheid organizations and individuals, and to resume sports links with unified non-racial sporting organizations within South Africa. Other resolutions adopted were: resolution 46/79 B, entitled "Programme of work of the Special Committee against Apartheid", in which the Assembly authorized the Committee to continue its monitoring activities, particularly regarding appropriate pressure on South Africa and assistance to the victims of apartheid; resolution 46/79 C, entitled "Military and other collaboration with South Africa", in which the Assembly expressed serious concern about the continuous violations of the mandatory arms embargo; resolution 46/79 D, entitled "Relations between South Africa and Israel"; resolution 47/79 E, entitled "Oil embargo against South Africa"; resolution 46/79 F, entitled "United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa", in which the Assembly expressed continued support to victims of repression and for the reintegration of exiles; and resolution 46/80, entitled "United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa", in which it called for facilitating the returnability and job placement of the South African graduates of the Programme.

122. The Security Council convened on 15 and 16 July 1992, at the urgent request of the Group of African States, to consider the question of South Africa, in particular the escalating violence as an obstacle to negotiations. At its 3095th and 3096th meetings, the Council listened to Member States and nine persons invited under rule 39 of the rules of procedure of the Security Council. Among the persons invited to address the Council were Mr. Nelson Mandela, President of ANC, Mr. Clarence Makwetu, President of PAC, Messrs. Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, Bantu Holomisa, Lucas M. Mangope and Oupa J. Gqozo, and in giving them the floor the President of the Council stated that the speaker would speak in his personal capacity and that it did not in any way entail the recognition by the Council or any of its members of the organization or entity it claimed to represent. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa, Mr. Roelof Botha, also addressed the Council.

123. After its deliberations on 16 July, the Council adopted resolution 765 (1992), in which it condemned the violence, urged the South African authorities to take immediate measures to end it and called upon all the parties to cooperate to that end. The Council also authorized the Secretary-General to dispatch urgently a Special Representative to hold discussions with the parties in South Africa, in order to recommend measures that would assist in bringing an effective end to the violence and in creating conditions for negotiations.

124. The Chairman and other Member States of the Special Committee actively participated in that debate. In his intervention at the 3095th meeting of the Security Council, 93/ the Chairman emphasized that "the continuing political violence in South Africa has put in jeopardy the peaceful negotiation process and transition to a non-racial democracy". Despite the repeal of some apartheid legislation, "legacies of apartheid and institutions that long sustained that institutionalized form of racial domination remain intact". He also stated that the conditions set out in the 1989 Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa were "yet to be fulfilled in their entirety". There were the following two "critical" questions that the Council had to address: "violence" and "the deadlock in the political negotiations". The Chairman emphasized that the "blame for political violence" rested "primarily" at the door of the Government, which had failed in its moral responsibility for the security of its citizens and the State. Moreover, he stated that the Government "must bear full responsibility, even if only indirectly, for the conduct of its agencies that invariably results in inadequate police investigations, sham trials and unwarranted acquittals of perpetrators of violence, ineffective jail sentences and bails and police cover-ups". He also requested the Council to "call upon all parties to the National Peace Accord to act in concert to implement its provisions and collectively give peace a chance in South Africa". The Chairman said that the South African regime had created "an impediment to the negotiations", which raised questions as to its "sincerity of purpose and long-term commitment to a non-racial democracy in that country". He emphasized that democratic principles "cannot be subverted in South Africa on the grounds that majority rule in that nation is tantamount to Black domination"; and that demands for guarantees that protect minority rights "must not be allowed to be the basis for establishing a White minority veto that could easily disrupt the normal functioning of a non-racial democratic society".

125. Mr. Cyrus Vance, who was appointed by the Secretary-General as his Special Representative for South Africa, departed on 21 July on a 10-day mission. To help ensure that the mass actions scheduled for 3 August "did not erupt into uncontrollable violence despite the wishes of all parties concerned", 94/ it was deemed necessary for the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to take certain exceptional interim measures. At the urging of Nelson Mandela, President of ANC, and with the agreement of the Government of South Africa, the Secretary-General decided to send 10 observers to monitor the demonstrations across the country in coordination with the National Peace Secretariat.

126. Based on the Special Representative's findings, the Secretary-General issued a report on 7 August 1992. 95/ Beyond its recommendations on the investigations of security agencies and armies as well as the immediate release of remaining political prisoners (see section II of the present report), the report also recommended, inter alia, that the efforts of the Goldstone Commission should be supported by the international community" and the recommendations of that Commission "need be acted upon"; that the "Goldstone Commission undertake a series of investigations into the functioning and operations of certain agencies"; that "reports of the Commission be made available to the signatories of the National Peace Accord within 24 hours of submission to the State President"; that the National Peace Accord needed to be "strengthened"; and that CODESA needed to consider the appointment of "an eminent and impartial person, who need not be a foreigner" so as to provide the impetus and cohesion that CODESA needs. It was also recommended that the United Nations make available some 30 observers (later increased to 50) to serve in South Africa, in close association with the National Peace Secretariat. On 17 August, after considering the report, the Security Council adopted resolution 772 (1992), in which it called upon the Government of South Africa and all parties in South Africa to implement urgently the relevant recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in his report. It also invited international organizations such as OAU, the Commonwealth and the European Community to consider deploying their own observers in South Africa in coordination with the United Nations and the structures set up under the National Peace Accord.

127. Other United Nations organs and agencies have continued to monitor the evolving process in South Africa. The ILO Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission visited South Africa in February 1992, to investigate whether the country's labour laws conformed with international standards. The three-man delegation also examined complaints made by COSATU against the 1988 Labour Relations Act amendments. 96/ COSATU requested the delegation to focus on areas such as: the right to strike; the right to collective bargaining; the right to organize trade union activities; and the state of industrial relations in the Transkei/Bophuthatswana/Venda/Ciskei (TBVC) and self-governing territories. 97/ The conclusions and recommendations of the ILO Commission are mentioned in paragraph 74 of the present report.

B. Intergovernmental organizations

128. The OAU Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State and Government on Southern Africa held its eighth session at Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, on 28 April 1992, to review developments in South Africa. While the Committee was encouraged by ongoing negotiations within the framework of CODESA, it urged the convening of a Patriotic Front Conference to forge unity among the liberation movements and other democratic forces. It regretted that some countries had taken unilateral measures to relax sanctions beyond the common position agreed upon by the international community on the phased lifting of sanctions. It stated that the establishment of an interim government and the holding of free and fair elections would mark the beginning of an irreversible march towards ending apartheid. It also appealed to all parties of the National Peace Accord of 14 September 1991 to take every possible step to end the carnage in townships. 98/

129. On 10 May, an OAU delegation led by Foreign Minister Ike Nwachukwu of Nigeria, arrived in South Africa to investigate township violence and to observe the proceedings of CODESA II. While in South Africa, the delegation met with all major parties, including parties not participating in CODESA, and reviewed efforts by the National Peace Committee and others to put an end to violence. 99/

130. The Council of Ministers of OAU held its fifty-sixth ordinary session at Dakar from 22 to 28 June 1992. The escalating violence dominated discussions on South Africa and a resolution was adopted 100/ that called for the urgent convening of a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to examine the issue of violence in South Africa and to take all appropriate action to put an end to it as well as to create conditions for negotiations leading towards a peaceful transition (see paras. 122-124). In mid-September, the Secretary-General of OAU dispatched an eight-man team of experts to continue with the work that the earlier mission had undertaken in May. Led by the Ambassador of Senegal to Zimbabwe, Dr. Ousmane Camara, the team held talks with leaders of all parties with a view to determining what OAU could do to assist in ending violence and hasten the process to democratic change. The team also examined modalities of sending an OAU observer group, within the context of Security Council resolution 772 (1992). 101/

131. In January 1992, members of the the European Community (EC) lifted their last economic sanctions against South Africa - on imports of gold coins and iron and steel products. Community Ministers formally adopted the decision without debate after Denmark, which had blocked the decision first taken in April 1991, decided to support it. 102/ On 6 April 1992, EC announced its decision to lift the oil embargo, which had been in effect since 1985. EC also stated that restrictive measures in the cultural, scientific and sporting fields were formally lifted. It was hoped that those measures would encourage positive developments in South Africa, in particular the establishment of an interim government. The embargo on imports and exports of arms and sensitive goods for the armed forces, along with measures affecting military and nuclear cooperation, remain in effect. 103/

132. In September 1992, an EC fact-finding mission, consisting of three ministers (the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and Denmark and the Secretary of State for Cooperation of Portugal), arrived in South Africa. The

ministers met with representatives of the Government and liberation movements, with a view to facilitating the resumption of negotiations. They also discussed the possibility of sending EC monitors to South Africa. EC also contributed R2.6 million to support emergency programmes designed to provide drought-affected rural communities in South Africa with access to safe and adequate water supplies. 104/

133. The Commonwealth has abided by the decision, taken at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in October 1991, to lift sanctions by phases in accordance with specific progress made towards substantive negotiations on a new constitution. 105/ In July 1992, Mr. Emeka Anyaoku, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, visited South Africa for talks with President de Klerk, ANC President Mandela and other political leaders. During meetings with the Government of South Africa, he proposed the Commonwealth's services as monitors of the current violence, observers of peace initiatives and facilitators of the negotiations process. 106/

C. Governments

134. The trend towards the relaxation of pressure on South Africa appears to have continued in the case of individual Governments.

135. During the latter part of 1991, Japan announced that it was lifting its economic, financial and trade sanctions against South Africa. 107/ Germany decided to lift restrictions on the import of South African gold coins, steel and iron in recognition of moves to abolish apartheid, although it decided to maintain its arms embargo. France decided to lift its ban on imports of South African coal, 108/ while Spain lifted sanctions on direct investments in South Africa. 109/

136. In March 1992, Singapore announced the lifting of its trade and investment sanctions on South Africa, but decided to maintain the ban on the sale of arms and on loans to the South African authorities and public enterprises. 110/ South Korea lifted economic sanctions imposed since 1978, opening the way for investment by South Korean companies and increased trade between the two countries. South Korean aircraft will also be allowed to fly to Johannesburg, but the ban on sales of arms and petroleum remains in place. 111/ Mexico decided to lift its trade sanctions and move towards establishing diplomatic relations with South Africa.

137. Following the decision taken at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in October 1991, some Commonwealth Governmnents lifted all "people-to-people" sanctions, including consular and visa restrictions, cultural, scientific and sports boycotts, bans on airlinks and restrictions on tourism promotion. 112/

138. The State Department of the United States issued a statement allowing the use of the United States export-import facilities in trade with South Africa. Before the stalemate at CODESA II, Mayor David Dinkins of New York City had announced that sanctions imposed in 1985 by the city would be lifted in phases following the establishment of an interim government in South Africa. The President of ANC, Mr. Nelson Mandela, agreed with this course of action. PAC, however, informed the Mayor that such a decision would harm the victims

of apartheid because the regime had reneged on a number of issues and thus could not be trusted. PAC emphasized that sanctions could be lifted only when a new constitution had been adopted by a democratically elected constituent assembly. 113/

D. Non-governmental and other organizations

139. Non-governmental and other organizations have continued to call for the application of pressure on South Africa, while pursuing their efforts to provide support to the anti-apartheid opposition and monitor the political situation in that country. When EC decided to lift the oil embargo in April, the EC Anti-Apartheid Movement strongly protested the decision. In a press release issued on 7 April, the Movement expressed its regret at the decision, calling it a "premature move, especially given the critical stage of the negotiations" that were taking place. They welcomed the fact that the 1985 package of EC "restrictive measures" covering a range of military, nuclear and other strategic sanctions remained intact.

140. The worldwide trade union movement has continued both to monitor political developments and to assist the labour movement in South Africa in various ways. In a display of international solidarity, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) and United States trade unions as well as the Africa Fund joined efforts to persuade the Crown Cork and Seal Company to reinstate 196 South African workers who had been fired after they participated in a nationwide two-day work "stay-away" to protest political violence in Black townships. The settlement was regarded as a significant victory for the South African labour movement. 114/

141. The Special Committee increased its exchange of information with non-governmental organizations in order to strengthen popular support for the process of peaceful change in South Africa. In this context, it contributed to and supported, in particular, projects by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, the American Committee on Africa, the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights under Law, the German Anti-Apartheid Movement, the Shipping Research Bureau and End Loans to South Africa. Moreover, the Special Committee continued to provide support for the New York-based Africa Arts Fund, Inc., which administers scholarships for South African students in the arts.

VI. REVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

142. During the period under review the Special Committee, in accordance with its mandate and with the guidelines set by the 1989 Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa (General Assembly resolution S-16/1, annex) as well as with the resolutions adopted at the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly, continued to initiate action by the Assembly to guide its policy on South Africa. To achieve this end, it monitors and analyses the developments in South Africa and the response of the international community to them.

143. In that context, the Special Committee has continued to monitor all factors threatening to derail the process of negotiations for peaceful change and issued early warnings when warranted.

144. Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining consensus on the question of South Africa at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, the Chairman of the Special Committee continued to keep close contact with groups and individuals in and outside South Africa, as well as with delegations at the United Nations, and consulted with them.

145. The Special Committee, during the period under review, mainly focused its attention on the persisting political violence, which the authorities were either unable or unwilling to bring under control; and the grave socio-economic inequalities in South Africa, which could jeopardize the fragile political process of negotiations towards the peaceful end of apartheid. It welcomed the commitment of the international community to encourage a transition to a democratic non-racial South Africa, but cautioned against the removal of restrictions on that country, which would undermine the international community's political leverage on Pretoria. The Committee advocated a phased application of pressure against South Africa in line with positive developments and the need for increased assistance for the disadvantaged sector of the South African population.

A. Action taken by the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session

146. During six plenary meetings of its forty-sixth session, the General Assembly considered agenda item 37, entitled "Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa", and on 13 December 1991 adopted resolutions 46/79 A to F on the subject. The Assembly was again able to preserve the consensus forged in 1989 by the adoption, by consensus, of the Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa and it adopted resolution 46/79 A, entitled "International efforts towards the total eradication of apartheid and support for the establishment of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa", without a vote. Moreover, for the first time, the resolution on the programme of work of the Special Committee against Apartheid (46/79 B) was adopted without a negative vote.

B. Activities of the Special Committee

147. On 18 February, the Secretary-General opened the 655th meeting, the first meeting of the Special Committee in 1992, and expressed the commitment of the United Nations to support fully the political process of a peaceful transition to a true democracy in South Africa. The Committee as well as the Secretary-General have an important and challenging duty during the difficult transition period and beyond, he stated.

148. At that meeting, the Chairman assessed the complex process of change in South Africa and outlined the different tasks of the Special Committee. He stressed, in particular, the importance of continuing to serve as a focal point for long-standing efforts of the United Nations to eradicate apartheid. The Committee's views and activities remained an important reference point for the international community and a catalyst for enhancing a coordinated contribution of the United Nations.

149. In the implementation of its programme of work, the Special Committee monitored closely and commented on developments in South Africa; and organized or participated in a number of conferences, seminars, hearings, missions and other events.

1. Assessment of and response to political developments in South Africa

150. The Special Committee, when necessary, responded to developments by issuing statements, organizing encounters with the media as well as holding meetings or briefings with Governments and with South Africans representing different segments of that society. The Chairman, on different occasions, met with the leadership of the national liberation movements to discuss the developments in and the promotion of the peace process in South Africa.

151. The Committee appealed to the Governments not to relax prematurely existing restrictive measures imposed on South Africa. In that context, on a number of occasions, it reiterated the importance of the concept of a phased application of appropriate pressure on Pretoria as warranted by developments.

152. The Special Committee maintained the view that restrictions in the fields of trade and investment should be upheld until the establishment in South Africa of transitional arrangements inspiring general confidence in the administration of that country; financial sanctions would remain until a transitional authority called for their removal. It also reiterated its view that the oil embargo and arms restrictions imposed by the Security Council should be lifted only at the final stage of the transition process in South Africa, when a new constitution was adopted and a democratically elected government had been installed.

153. In that context, in January and in April 1992, the Special Committee expressed concern at the lifting of restrictive measures by the European Community, in particular its oil embargo.

154. The recurring violence in South Africa remained a major concern of the Special Committee. Violence was seen by the Committee as having a disruptive effect on the ongoing efforts to foster a peaceful political process in the country. In January 1992, the Special Committee expressed its concern at incidents such as the firing by the South African Police at residents of the Ennerdale community who were peacefully protesting increased electricity and water service charges; gang attacks on commuter trains resulting in numerous deaths of innocent people; the politically motivated killings of whole families; the bombing of schools, post offices and offices of political organizations; and other acts of violence. The Committee was particularly appalled by the massacre on 17 June 1992, which claimed the lives of at least 39 persons when armed men randomly attacked residents of Boipatong and Slovo in the Johannesburg area.

155. In response to these developments, the Special Committee called upon the South African authorities to take firm action against members of the police and the security forces who do not conform to established norms of conduct in the maintenance of domestic peace, so as to restore both internal and international confidence in the impartiality of the police force. It also called for guarantees that the South African authorities would not return to arbitrary political arrests and detentions of anti-apartheid activists; and for the implementation of the provisions of the National Peace Accord. In particular, it supported a total ban on the carrying of dangerous weapons as recommended in the Second Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, otherwise known as the Goldstone Commission.

156. It is important to note that throughout the period under review, the Special Committee welcomed all positive measures taken by the South African authorities towards the creation of an appropriate climate for negotiations.

157. In a statement made at the first plenary session of CODESA in December 1991, the Chairman expressed the Special Committee's satisfaction in witnessing the launching of a process that would ultimately lead to the elimination of apartheid and to the establishment of a new, non-racial and democratic South Africa. The United Nations reaffirmed its responsibility to pursue all necessary measures so as to ensure the realization of these aims. After the failure of the parties to reach agreement on certain issues during the second plenary session of CODESA, the Special Committee expressed its earnest hopes for the continuation of the process and its full support for a resumption of the negotiations suspended in June 1992.

158. While the Special Committee expressed the hope that the referendum on 17 March 1992 would be the last held for Whites only in the process of political change in South Africa, it welcomed the decisive outcome of the referendum as a sign of overwhelming support for a negotiated end to apartheid. The Special Committee called on all parties concerned to make effective use of that impetus to hasten the negotiating process, and expressed the urgent need for the creation of a climate conducive to free political activity. In this context, the importance of making the political process in South Africa irreversible has been stressed, and it has been underlined that a reversal from the current negotiations would have disastrous consequences both inside and outside South Africa.

159. Later, in a statement addressed to the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Jakarta from 1 to 6 September 1992, the Chairman of the Special Committee expressed concern at the stalled negotiations within CODESA and called on the South African authorities to move the democratic process forward.

2. Seminar on South Africa's Socio-Economic Problems: Future Role of the United Nations System in Helping to Address Them

160. The Seminar was organized by the Special Committee against Apartheid and the Centre against Apartheid and was held at Windhoek, Namibia, from 22 to 24 May 1992. It was hosted by the Government of Namibia.

161. About 30 South Africans, representing various South African organizations or participating as experts from universities, industrial and banking agencies and other organizations and institutions involved in social and economic analysis and policy planning, and about 35 representatives of United Nations bodies, specialized agencies and other offices, took part in the Seminar.

162. The issues discussed at the Seminar were the following: measures for economic growth; the redistribution of opportunity, input, income and services; human resource development needs; and resource needs for the socio-economic restructuring of a new South Africa.

163. Upon the conclusion of the Seminar, the Chairman of the Special Committee made an overall preliminary assessment of the discussions and identified broad points of reference for designing, organizing and implementing future technical cooperation between a new South Africa and the United Nations system. He underlined the capability of the Special Committee to serve as focal point of the United Nations for its relationship with South Africa before, during and after the establishment of an interim government and until the establishment of a democratic and non-racial South Africa. The participants endorsed the Chairman's concluding observations by acclamation (for the report of the Seminar, see A/AC.115/L.685).

3. Consultations with United States and Canadian anti-apartheid movements and other non-governmental organizations concerned

164. The Special Committee held consultations at United Nations Headquarters on 29 and 30 June 1992. The objectives of the consultations were to afford anti-apartheid movements and other non-governmental organizations concerned in North America an opportunity to develop a new approach to their work during the transitional period and beyond; and to identify relevant issues and programmes of action, inter alia, to promote the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on South Africa, to foster constitutional change, to strengthen the civil society in South Africa and to address critical socio-economic inequities resulting from decades of apartheid (for the report on the consultations, see A/AC.115/L.688).

4. International Hearing on Political Violence in South Africa and the Implementation of the National Peace Accord

165. The British Anti-Apartheid Movement organized an International Hearing on Political Violence in South Africa and the Implementation of the National Peace Accord, which was co-sponsored by the Special Committee against Apartheid, and held in London on 14 and 15 July 1992. Discussions focused on the causes and impact of violence and on an assessment of the National Peace Accord and other initiatives to stop it. Evidence was heard from witnesses of the killings in South Africa and from civil rights workers. The concluding statement of the Hearing called for the international community to intervene, "through the establishment of appropriate mechanisms, to ensure not only the effective monitoring of political violence, which would require wide investigative and other powers, but also the means to end the violence". It further concluded that political violence had reached such levels that it seriously threatened the prospects for the democratic transformation of South Africa. The Hearing provided an opportunity to identify the key issues that must be addressed before any further negotiations could take place. There could be no prospect of bona fide negotiations taking place as envisaged in the United Nations Declaration on Apartheid (resolution S-16/1, annex) unless the international community took action immediately (for the report of the Hearing, see A/AC.115/L.687).

5. Cooperation with other United Nations bodies and other organizations

166. The Special Committee continued to cooperate with other United Nations bodies and intergovernmental, non-governmental and anti-apartheid organizations, movements and groups; and it participated in their meetings when warranted. Statements and messages were sent to events where direct participation of the Committee was not possible.

167. The Committee pursued its close cooperation with the Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa and the Commission against Apartheid in Sports and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa. It expandéd its close working relationship with a number of United Nations bodies, specialized agencies and departments, in particular, in the framework of the preparation, conduct and follow-up of the Seminar at Windhoek. The Special Committee continued to cooperate with the ILO Committee on Action against Apartheid and with the Centre for Human Rights at Geneva. Among other bodies, the Special Committee established a new relationship with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Fund for Women.

6. Conference on Educational Assistance to Disadvantaged South Africans

168. The Conference on Educational Assistance to Disadvantaged South Africans, organized by the Centre Against Apartheid under the auspices of UNETPSA and its Advisory Committee with the full financial support and participation of the Special Committee, was held in New York on 8 and 9 September 1992. Some 140 participants attended the Conference (for the report of the Conference, see A/47/513, paras. 11-23).

169. The Special Committee, through its Chairman and other members of the bureau, was represented at meetings of OAU, including those of its Liberation Committee. Of particular importance was the Special Committee's participation in the fifty-sixth ordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers at Dakar in June 1992, where a resolution was adopted calling for the situation in South Africa to be brought to the attention of the Security Council (see para. 130).

170. It participated in the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Jakarta in September 1992.

7. Observance of international days and round tables

171. As in previous years, the Special Committee observed the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (21 March 1992), the International Day of Solidarity with the Struggling People of South Africa (16 June 1992), the International Day of Solidarity with the Struggle of Women in South Africa (9 August 1992) and the Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners (11 October 1992).

172. In addition to the formal meetings of the observances, the Special Committee held round-table discussions where prominent South African personalities, members of non-governmental organizations, representatives of United Nations bodies and other well-known individuals with expertise in their respective fields were among the panelists. The problem of racism and racial discrimination with particular emphasis on its institutionalized form in apartheid South Africa; assessment of the political violence in that country; the impact of the present political process on the situation of women and children and their participation in the transformation of South Africa; and the role of law enforcement and law enforcement officials in the transition period in South Africa and beyond were some of the subjects reviewed at the respective round tables.

8. Other activities

173. In March and June 1992, the Chairman of the Special Committee, while on official travel to the United Kingdom and in the United States, delivered lectures on apartheid and on the current situation in South Africa. While in London, he participated in the launching of the "Vote for Democracy in South Africa" campaign organized by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement.

174. The Special Committee displayed the updated United Nations Anti-Apartheid Travelling Exhibit. The Exhibit was shown during the period under review in Washington, D.C., and in Berlin, Gera and Leipzig in Germany.

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

175. With the creation of a negotiating framework in December 1991, the political process in South Africa reached a new stage. Despite wide political differences, these first broad-based negotiations, moving ahead for several months, brought hopes for an early political settlement in South Africa. But developments since May 1992 have demonstrated that the political process in that country is fragile and vulnerable, and that a sustained process to reach a peaceful, negotiated solution needs not only political will and tolerance among the leadership involved in the negotiations, but also a climate of domestic peace in the society as a whole.

176. Violence, which has continued to bring fear and horror to the South African society and has constantly aggravated a lack of trust between the main political actors, culminated on the night of 17 June. The Boipatong massacre shocked the international community and highlighted the necessity of its urgent involvement in assisting to contain and bring the violence to an end. The decision of the Security Council, OAU, the Commonwealth and the European Community to send observers to monitor the political violence has been welcomed by all major political parties and organizations in South Africa and outside. There is a strong expectation that neutral observers would also help to defuse the political tension and promote an environment in which serious and constructive negotiations could bring about a long-lasting solution in South Africa.

177. Socio-economic inequalities, deeply rooted in decades of apartheid, continue to plague the majority of the South African population and could threaten to undermine a peaceful and stable development through a transition period and beyond. A United Nations seminar organized by the Special Committee and the Centre Against Apartheid at Windhoek in May 1992 (see paras. 160-163) demonstrated the will of the international community to help address the socio-economic problems facing South Africa. Now, as the socio-economic dimensions of South Africa's transition are moving into focus, the Special Committee and the Centre are ready to concentrate their attention on the requirements of the disadvantaged sectors of South African society and to promote appropriate and coordinated responses from the international community. The Special Committee fully supports the establishment in South Africa of an economic negotiating forum that would seek an accord between government, business and labour. It is hoped that the forum will address, inter alia, the problem of resetting economic priorities towards the correction of socio-economic imbalances engendered by decades of apartheid and an economic growth process capable of sustaining a considerable widening of services, human resource development and economic participation.

178. The referendum of the White electorate on 17 March 1992, which clearly demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of White South Africans support the process of change, had an important impact on the political situation in South Africa. However, the Special Committee expressed its concern about the referendum's lack of universality, since it had involved only about 15 per cent of the total population of South Africa. The Special Committee hoped that the referendum would be the last in the history of the country to be conducted by only a segment of the South African population.

179. Unfulfilled expectations of the Black majority, violence, deprivation and decay in the townships and huge unemployment may threaten to bring the country to the edge of a civil war. Under these circumstances, any delay in bringing about a political settlement could be disastrous. The economic price of delaying a settlement is also growing rapidly. These are powerful factors, which should move all parties in South Africa to reach an agreement as soon as possible. Time is on no one's side. South Africa urgently needs an interim government of national unity to prepare elections for a constitution-making body and to administer the country until a new government has been elected on the basis of an agreed democratic and non-racial constitution. This cannot come about unless negotiations are resumed in some form or other. The Special Committee has confidence that common sense will prevail and that the parties will be able to reach the consensus necessary for a new South Africa to emerge.

180. Apartheid will have been eradicated only when a new constitution has been adopted, and a new government has been installed as a result of a free and fair election based on this constitution. The Special Committee cannot, therefore, support the view that apartheid is a closed page in the history of South Africa. Old legislative and executive structures of an apartheid nature are still in place and the majority of the population has not yet been able to exercise the right to vote. While many apartheid laws have been dismantled in the past two years, the legacy of apartheid continues to pose a threat to the process of democratization. Apartheid has not only bitterly divided a nation but has also resulted in glaring disparities in the socio-economic situation. Even after the adoption of a new constitution, the dismantling of a system that has been so deeply embedded in the structure and everyday life of the country will not be without difficulties and pain. The legacy left behind by apartheid will be complex and will take long years to overcome.

181. The Special Committee, therefore, recommends that the General Assembly should:

(a) Reaffirm its determination to support the South African people in their legitimate struggle for the total elimination of apartheid through peaceful means and in their efforts to build together a non-racial and democratic society;

(b) Reaffirm the principles and goals envisaged in the consensus Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa, contained in the annex to its resolution S-16/1 of 14 December 1989, which, inter alia, called for negotiations in a climate free of violence;

(c) Reiterate its conviction that broad-based negotiations resulting in a new non-racial and democratic constitution and its early entry into force will lead to the total elimination of apartheid through peaceful means;

(d) Reiterate its strong support for the peaceful negotiation process in South Africa;

(e) Note that while positive measures have been taken by the South African authorities towards the creation of a better climate for negotiations, including the repeal of key apartheid laws, the revision of major security legislation and the release of remaining political prisoners, serious

obstacles to achieving a climate conducive to free political activity still remain;

(f) Welcome the decisions taken by the Security Council on 16 July and 17 August 1992 (resolutions 765 (1992) and 772 (1992) respectively), its statement on the spiralling cycle of violence of 10 September 1992 (S/24541), the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of 7 August 1992 on the mission to South Africa of his Special Representative (S/24389) and the measures taken by the Secretary-General to assist the process in South Africa in strengthening the structures set up under the National Peace Accord, including the deployment there of United Nations observers;

(g) Urge the South African authorities to exercise fully and impartially the primary responsiblity of government to bring to an end the ongoing violence, to protect the lives, security and property of all South Africans in all of South Africa, and to bring to justice those responsible for acts of violence;

(h) Urge the South African authorities to assume fully the responsibility to respect and protect the right of South Africans to demonstrate peacefully in public in order to convey their views effectively;

(i) Call upon the signatories to the National Peace Accord to recommit themselves to the process of peaceful change by fully and effectively implementing its provisions, by cooperating with each other to that end, and upon all parties in South Africa to refrain from acts of violence;

(j) Note with satisfaction the release of prisoners held for their political beliefs or activities, and the agreements reflected in the Record of Understanding of 26 September 1992, which paved the way for the negotiations;

(k) Urge the representatives of the people of South Africa to resume, without further delay, broad-based negotiations on transitional arrangements and basic principles for a process of reaching agreement on a new constitution and for its speedy entering into force;

(l) Call upon the international community to support the process in South Africa through a phased application of appropriate measures with regard to the South African authorities, as warranted by ongoing developments, and, within the context of the need to respond appropriately to them, to review existing restrictive measures as warranted by positive developments, such as agreement by the parties on transitional arrangements, including the election of a constitution-making structure, and agreement on a new, non-racial and democratic constitution;

(m) Urge the international community to respect the existing measures imposed by the Security Council for the purpose of bringing an early end to apartheid in South Africa, and request the Security Council to continue to monitor its effective implementation;

(n) Appeal to the international community to increase humanitarian and legal assistance to the victims of apartheid, in particular, to the returning refugees and exiles, and to released political prisoners;

(o) Appeal also to the international community to help create stable conditions for the rapid and peaceful attainment of a new South Africa based on a negotiated, democratic and non-racial constitution by providing appropriate material, financial and other assistance to South Africans in their efforts to address the serious socio-economic problems, particularly in the areas of human resource development and employment, health and housing;

(p) Request the Secretary-General to continue to ensure the coordination of activities of the United Nations and its agencies with regard to, and, as appropriate, inside South Africa, and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session on measures taken to facilitate the peaceful elimination of apartheid and the transition of South Africa to a non-racial and democratic society as envisaged in the Declaration on Apartheid;

(q) Authorize the Special Committee against Apartheid, in accordance with its mandate, to mobilize international support for the elimination of apartheid through the early establishment in South Africa of a society based on a peacefully negotiated democratic and non-racial constitution, and to this end (i) to continue to monitor the complex developments in South Africa, and to collect, analyse and disseminate factual information in this regard; (ii) to facilitate a peaceful and stable transition in South Africa by promoting international assistance in helping South Africans to overcome the negative social and economic consequences of the policies of apartheid, inter alia, by organizing seminars on well-defined and specific topics with the participation of experts in the relevant fields and in cooperation with relevant offices and agencies in the United Nations system and other intergovernmental organizations, institutions and non-governmental organizations; (iii) to conduct liaison and consult with Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, foundations and institutions, as well as other relevant groups, both inside and outside South Africa; and (iv) to undertake other relevant activities aimed at supporting the political process of peaceful change in South Africa;

(r) Appeal to Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to continue their cooperation with the Special Committee against Apartheid, and also request all relevant components of the United Nations system to continue to cooperate with the Special Committee and the United Nations Centre against Apartheid in their activities in support of the ongoing process of peaceful elimination of apartheid in South Africa.

Part Two

REPORT ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ISRAEL

I. INTRODUCTION

182. The Special Commitee, at the request of the General Assembly, has continued to review the developments of the ongoing collaboration between Israel and South Africa, especially in the military and nuclear fields, and to submit annual reports thereon since the 1970s. The Committee views the problem of this ongoing collaboration from the standpoint of its effect on the concerted international efforts aimed at the total eradication of apartheid and support for the establishment of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa.

183. In its resolution 46/79 D of 13 December 1991, the General Assembly noted with concern that the military relations between South Africa and Israel continued unabated; requested the Special Committee to continue to monitor the relations between South Africa and Israel and keep them under constant review and report to the Assembly and the Security Council as appropriate.

184. The present report has been prepared in accordance with paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 46/79 D.

II. MILITARY AND NUCLEAR COLLABORATION

185. There have been media reports that military and nuclear cooperation between Israel and South Africa has been continuing. On 16 December 1991, Israeli Foreign Affairs reported that there had been "persistent rumours, which cannot be confirmed, that Israel [was] storing South Africa's nuclear weapons".

186. According to the same issue of Israeli Foreign Affairs, the main purposes of President F. W. de Klerk's visit to Israel in November of 1991 (see para. 198) were to negotiate secretly with the Government of Israel the future of the military contracts with South Africa, which had been signed by the then Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr. Balthasar J. Vorster, in 1976, and to urge the Israeli Government to invest in South Africa.

187. According to a report in Israeli Foreign Affairs on 16 December 1991, Israel was involved with major missile projects with ARMSCOR.

188. In this connection, on 5 November 1991 Israeli Foreign Affairs had reported that a senior American journalist, in his book The Samson Option on Israeli collaboration with South Africa, especially in the nuclear field, alleged that nuclear collaboration between the two regimes began during the 1960s, when Israel provided South Africa with design technology for manufacturing low-yield 175 mm and 203 mm nuclear artillery shells. According to the author, Israeli and South African scientists have worked together secretly over nearly three decades to produce a nuclear bomb successfully, testing at least three warheads off the Cape coast during the late 1970s.

189. On 20 February 1992, Business Day (Johannesburg) stated that the United States Government was reported to have offered to lift sanctions imposed against ARMSCOR provided that cooperation with Israel on a ballistic missile development project was terminated. According to the media reports, the negotiations did not lead to an agreement.

190. On 13 March 1992, The Wall Street Journal reported that United States intelligence agencies had strong evidence that Israel had been arming South Africa through unauthorized sales of sensitive United States weapons technology. The paper said that, according to United States officials, the classified intelligence provided overwhelming evidence that Israel had re-exported weapons containing United States technology without first obtaining the required approval. The recent report by the United States Administration marked the first time the Government had publicly released evidence that Israel had exported United States weapons technology without authorization. 115/

191. On 13 March 1992, The Los Angeles Times reported that Israel had passed technology from its United States-funded Arrow anti-missile to South Africa and cited "evidence that Israel last year illegally diverted missile technology from the project (Arrow) to Israel's Jericho II offensive missile project, then shared the technology with South Africa".

192. On 10 April 1992, Southscan (London) reported that in a case similar to the above, Israel in the 1980s had passed on to South Africa the technology

for the Lavi aircraft, which the United States had funded to the tune of $900 million and then forced Israel to cancel on budgetary grounds. Last year, South Africa scrapped plans to build a jet fighter aircraft modelled on the Lavi.

193. On 16 March 1992, The New York Times reported that South Africa had obtained missile technology and anti-tank missiles from Israel. 116/

194. Israeli Foreign Affairs reported on 25 March 1992 that Israel had sold to South Africa the Mapats anti-tank missile, a close copy of the United States TOW-2 missile, and the Python 3 air-to-air missile, which is an adaptation of the United States Side Winder missile. 117/

195. On 9 June 1992, The Washington Post reported that, as a result of the cooperation between the two countries, South Africa had built at least three intermediate-range missiles, two with two-stage rockets. Their tests were undertaken at South Africa's Overberg range near Bredosdrop, 120 miles east of Cape Town.

196. In its issue of 5 November 1991, Israeli Foreign Affairs linked a decision by the United States Government to prevent an Israeli sale of ballistic missile components to South Africa, to nuclear proliferation concerns.

197. In the same issue, Israeli Foreign Affairs analysed a decision by the United States Government impeding an Israeli sale of ballistic missile components to South Africa. It linked the concern in the United States about Israeli-South African collaboration in the military and nuclear fields with growing evidence of such collaboration. Ballistic missiles, for which South Africa obtained technology from Israel, can be used as delivery systems for both conventional warheads and for weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. They can also be used for launching satellites, including satellites for military communications and weapons guidance.

III. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE COLLABORATION

198. In the previous report of the Special Committee, 118/ it was reported that President F. W. de Klerk visited Israel from 10 to 14 November 1991, following the decision of the Government of Israel in July 1991 to lift economic sanctions against South Africa. During that visit a memorandum of understanding on multiple cooperation was signed between the two countries, focusing on cultural, artistic, scientific, sporting, educational, medical, agricultural, tourist, transport and technical fields as well as "other areas", according to The Jerusalem Post of 12 November 1991. The memorandum stated that the two countries would "use their best endeavours" to cooperate at the highest level, including "proposals relating to the conclusion of special agreements covering specific projects of investment, in industrial and financial cooperation". 119/

199. As a result of this visit, an Israeli delegation visited South Africa in February 1992. The delegation included representatives of the Ministries of Finance, Industry and Commerce, Agriculture and Tourism. 120/

200. Israeli Foreign Affairs of 20 February 1992 reported that Israel had trained most, if not all, of Inkatha's intelligence operatives, including an assistant to the party's leader, Dr. Buthelezi. It had also been reported that members of KwaZulu's intelligence had similar training in Israel. 121/

201. According to The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg) of 19 December 1991 and 2 January 1992, some of the 200 members of Inkatha based at Mkuze had previously undergone training in Israel for hit squad purposes. The paper also reported that, according to South African Police sources, four former Mkuze trainees who were being sought in connection with murder and attempted murder had undergone training in Israel.

202. The Jerusalem Post, in its issue of 9 March 1992, stated that most of the senior officers of Bophuthatswana had been to Israel at least once. The paper argued in favour of recognizing the "independence" of this Bantustan by referring to its important and growing relations with Israel and mutual interests between the leaders of this Bantustan and Israel.

203. According to the statistics available for 1991, Israeli exports to South Africa were reported at US$ 98 million and the imports of Israel from South Africa at US$ 235 million.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

204. The ongoing collaboration between Israel and South Africa, especially in the military and nuclear fields, is a matter of great concern to the international community. South Africa is one of Israel's major arms customers. This collaboration is in violation of Security Council resolutions 418 (1977) and 421 (1977), of 4 November and 9 December 1977, respectively, concerning the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

205. The Special Committee urges the international community, and particularly the Security Council, to take effective action to end violation of the arms embargo against South Africa by Israel.

206. The Special Committee recommends that the General Assembly call upon Israel to cease forthwith its continuing collaboration with South Africa, particularly in the military and nuclear fields, and authorizes the Special Committee to continue monitoring relations between Israel and South Africa and to report to the Assembly and to the Security Council as appropriate.

Notes

1/ The participants in CODESA were, in alphabetical order: the African National Congress of South Africa, the Bophuthatswana Government, the Ciskei Government, the Democratic Party, the Dikwankwetla Party, the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Inyandza National Movement, the Intando Yesizwe Party, the Labour Party, the Natal/Transvaal Indian Congress, the National Party, the National People's Party, the Solidarity Party, the South African Communist Party, the South African Government, the Transkei Government, the United People's Front, the Venda Government and the Ximoko Progressive Party.

2/ Weekend Argus (Cape Town), 29 August 1992.

3/ Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), Statement on Meeting between PAC and the South African Regime, 14 April 1992.

4/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 20 August 1992.

5/ The Star (Johannesburg), 26 August 1992.

6/ Human Rights Commission, Monthly Summary Reports on Repression, January to August 1992.

7/ International Commission of Jurists, Agenda for Peace, Geneva, March 1992.

8/ Human Rights Commission, Summary Report on Repression, August 1992, and Statement on National Peace Accord.

9/ Agence France-Presse, 15 September 1992.

10/ Human Rights Commission, Checkmate for Apartheid: Special report on two years of destabilization, July 1990 to June 1992.

11/ The New York Times, 24 April and 1 May 1992.

12/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 22-28 May 1992.

13/ Amnesty International, South Africa: State of Fear, June 1992.

14/ African National Congress, statement of the Emergency Meeting of the National Executive Committee, 23 June 1992.

15/ The Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 26 July 1992.

16/ Human Rights Commission, Summary Report on Repression, August 1992.

17/ S/24389, para. 69.

18/ The Guardian (London), 28 August 1992.

19/ African National Congress, statement on the Bisho Killings, 7 September 1992.

20/ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, South Africa Repatriation Operation: Situation Report, No. 26, 24 August 1992.

21/ S/24389, para. 79.

22/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 4 August 1992.

23/ The New York Times, 14 August 1992.

24/ Financial Times (London), 4 August 1992, and Business Day (Johannesburg), 5 August 1992.

25/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 14 August 1992.

26/ African National Congress, statement of the National Executive Committee, 3 September 1992.

27/ President F. W. de Klerk, statement on the events in Ciskei, 9 September 1992.

28/ The Washington Post and The New York Times, 11 September 1992.

29/ African National Congress, statement of the National Executive Committee, 10 September 1992.

30/ Business Day (Johannesburg), 19 August 1992.

31/ Economist Intelligence Unit, South Africa Country Report, No. 2, London, 1992, and Financial Times (London), 4 August 1992.

32/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 20 March 1992.

33/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 14 May 1992, and The Sowetan (Johannesburg), 4 May 1992.

34/ International Labour Office, Special Report of the Director-General on the Application of the Declaration concerning Action against Apartheid, 79th session, 1992.

35/ South African Chamber of Business, press statement on the business confidence index, 7 September 1992.

36/ Economist Intelligence Unit, South Africa Country Report, No. 2, London, 1992, and The Star (Johannesburg), 13 May 1992.

37/ Economist Intelligence Unit, South Africa Country Report, No. 2, London, 1992.

38/ Financial Times (London), 5 June 1992, and World Bank, Agriculture and the Rural Economy in South Africa, Briefing Note, 1992.

39/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 27 May 1992, and Southern African Report (Johannesburg), 1 May 1992.

40/ Address by Dr. C. L. Stals, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at the 72nd ordinary general meeting of shareholders of the Bank, 25 August 1992.

41/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 20 March 1992, and Southscan (London), 28 February 1992.

42/ International Monetary Fund, Economic Policies for a New South Africa, Occasional Paper No. 91 (January 1992), p. 13.

43/ David Lewis, The Debate on Economic Policy on South Africa, background paper, Windhoek Seminar on South Africa's Socio-Economic Problems: Future Role of the United Nations System in Helping Address Them, May 1992.

44/ World Bank, Economic Work Program on South Africa, Briefing Note, 1992.

45/ The Sowetan (Johannesburg), 2 June 1992.

46/ South African Institute of Race Relations, Race Relations Survey, 1991/1992.

47/ The Star (Johannesburg), 5 February 1992, and International Labour Office, Special Report of the Director-General on the Application of the Declaration concerning Action against Apartheid, 79th session, 1992.

48/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 12-18 June 1992.

49/ Ibid., 21-27 August 1992.

50/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 6 March 1992.

51/ Financial Times (London), 5 June 1992.

52/ Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 22 May 1992.

53/ The Star (Johannesburg), 3 June 1992.

54/ The Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 27 March-2 April 1992.

55/ The Citizen (Johannesburg), 8 February 1992.

56/ The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), 8 April 1992.

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ANNEX I

Composition of the Special Committee against Apartheid and its subsidiary bodies, and of the Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa, and of the Commission against Apartheid in Sports

A. Special Committee against Apartheid

1. The Special Committee against Apartheid, established by the General Assembly in its resolution 1761 (XVII) of 6 November 1962, is composed of the following 17 Member States:

Algeria	Malaysia	Sudan
Ghana	Nepal	Syrian Arab Republic
Guinea	Nigeria	Trinidad and Tobago
Haiti	Peru	Ukraine
India	Philippines	Zimbabwe
Indonesia	Somalia	

2. At its 655th meeting, on 18 February 1992, the Special Committee unanimously re-elected Professor Ibrahim A. Gambari (Nigeria) as its Chairman, and Mr. Jayaraj Acharya (Nepal) as its Vice-Chairman. Mr. Suresh K. Goel (India) was re-elected as its Rapporteur.

3. At its 658th meeting, on 9 July 1992, the Special Committee elected Mr. Victor H. Batiouk (Ukraine) as its Vice-Chairman. Mrs. Anette des Iles (Trinidad and Tobago) was elected Vice-Chairman at the 660th meeting of the Special Committee, on 10 August 1992.

4. Also at its 655th meeting, on 18 February 1992, the Special Committee re-elected Mr. Kofi Nyidevu Awoonor (Ghana) as Chairman of its Subcommittee on the Implementation of United Nations Resolutions on South Africa, and Mr. Simbarashe Simbanenduku Mumbengegwi (Zimbabwe) as Chairman of its Subcommittee on Developments in South Africa.

B. Subsidiary bodies of the Special Committee

Subcommittee on the Implementation of United Nations Resolutions on South Africa:

Ghana (Chairman), Guinea, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic.

Subcommittee on Developments in South Africa:

Algeria, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, Zimbabwe (Chairman).

C. Intergovernmental Group to Monitor the Supply and Shipping of Oil and Petroleum Products to South Africa

Algeria, Cuba, Indonesia, Kuwait (Vice-Chairman), New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway (Rapporteur), Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania (Chairman).

D. Commission against Apartheid in Sports a/

Gbeđevi Zikpu Aguigah	(Togo)
Abdul Karim M. Al-Ethawy	(Iraq)
Tesfay Fichala	(Ethiopia)
James Victor Gbeho	(Ghana)
Raúl González Rodríguez	(Mexico)
Lionel A. Hurst	(Antigua and Barbuda)
Joseph Lagu	(Sudan)
Francis Malambugi	(United Republic of Tanzania)
E. Besley Maycock	(Barbados)
Sedfrey Ordoñez	(Philippines)
Vladimir Platonov	(Ukraine)
Allan Rae	(Jamaica)
Jai Pratap Rana	(Nepal)
Boris Topornin	(Russian Federation)
Zoumana Traore	(Burkina Faso)

Notes

a/ According to the International Convention against Apartheid in Sports (see General Assembly resolution 40/64 G, annex), in particular article 11, paragraph 5, the members of the Commission "shall be elected for a term of four years. However, the terms of nine of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two years; immediately after the first election, the names of these nine members shall be chosen by lot by the Chairman of the Commission".

ANNEX II

Chronology of statements issued by the Special Committee

1.	GA/AP/2058 (30 October 1991)	Announcing consultations with non-governmental organizations and anti-apartheid movements
2.	GA/AP/2059 (7 November 1991)	Concluding meeting with anti-apartheid movements and non-governmental organizations
3.	GA/AP/2060 (20 December 1991)	Statement on the occasion of the first plenary session of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa
4.	GA/AP/2061 (30 January 1992)	Calling on the European Community to continue pressure on South African authorities
5.	GA/AP/2062 (30 January 1992)	Expressing concern at ongoing violence in South Africa
6.	GA/AP/2065 (26 February 1992)	Saying the referendum for Whites in South Africa represents a "denouement" in the process of political change
7.	GA/AP/2066 (13 March 1992)	Observance of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
8.	GA/AP/2067 (18 March 1992)	Commenting on the South African referendum
9.	GA/AP/2071 (7 April 1992)	Commenting on the European Community's decision to lift the oil embargo against South Africa
10.	GA/AP/2072 (15 May 1992)	Announcing the Seminar on South Africa's Socio-economic Problems: Future Role of the United Nations System in Helping to Address Them, Windhoek
11.	GA/AP/2073 (28 May 1992)	Seminar agrees on need for urgent redress of critical socio-economic situation
12.	GA/AP/2075 (11 June 1992)	Observance of Soweto Day
13.	GA/AP/2077 (19 June 1992)	Expressing grave concern over the massacre in South Africa on 17 June 1992
14.	GA/AP/2078 and Rev.1 (22 June 1992)	Announcing consultations with United States and Canadian anti-apartheid movements, New York
15.	GA/AP/2079 (2 July 1992)	Special Committee to hold consultations with United States and Canadian anti-apartheid movements

16.	GA/AP/2080 (2 July 1992)	Announcing the International Hearing on Political Violence in South Africa, London
17.	GA/AP/2083 and Rev.1 (4 August 1992)	Observance of the International Day of Solidarity with the Struggle of the Women in South Africa
18.	GA/AP/2086 and Rev.1 (19 August 1992)	Announcing the Follow-up Conference on Educational Assistance to Disadvantaged South Africans, New York
19.	GA/AP/2087 (3 September 1992)	Announcing the agenda for the Follow-up Conference on Educational Assistance to Disadvantaged South Africans, New York
20.	GA/AP/2089 (9 September 1992)	Expressing grave concern over killings in Ciskei
21.	GA/AP/2091 (1 October 1992)	Welcoming the release of South African political prisoners
22.	GA/AP/2092 (2 October 1992)	Expressing support for the Goldstone Commission's call for criminal investigation of those responsible in the Ciskei massacre
23.	GA/AP/2093 (5 October 1992)	Observance of the International Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners
24.	GA/AP/2098 (28 October 1992)	Citing "senseless killing" in South Africa, the Special Committee urges political leaders to meet on ways to curtail the unfortunate violence

ANNEX III

List of documents

A/AC.115/L.681	Messages received on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners
A/AC.115/L.682	Report on the International Conference on Eastern Europe and Southern Africa: Supporting Democracy and Development, held at Prague from 13 to 15 June 1991
A/AC.115/L.683	Report on the Consultations with Non-Governmental Organizations and Anti-Apartheid Movements, held at Geneva on 4 and 5 November 1991
A/AC.115/L.684	Messages received on the occasion of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
A/AC.115/L.685	Report of the Seminar on South Africa's Socio-Economic Problems: Future Role of the United Nations System in Helping to Address Them, held at Windhoek from 22 to 24 May 1992
A/AC.115/L.686	Messages received on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Struggling People of South Africa (Soweto Day)
A/AC.115/L.687	Report of the International Hearing on Political Violence in South Africa and the Implementation of the National Peace Accord, held at London on 14 and 15 July 1992
A/AC.115/L.688	Report on the Consultations with United States and Canadian Anti-Apartheid Movements and Other Non-Governmental Organizations Concerned, held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on 29 and 30 June 1992
A/AC.115/L.689	Messages received on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Struggle of the Women in South Africa

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